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3 
Introduction 
Moral theories are usually divided into three approaches: consequentialist, 
deontological, and virtue ethics. The common representation of consequentialist ethics is 
utilitarianism and the deontological approach most often refers to Kantianism. In general, 
these two theories have been the leading ethical theories for the last couple of centuries. To 
put it very simply, the concern of utilitarians is happiness and utility and the concern of 
Kantians is the moral law. In addition to these two theories, virtue ethics has made a 
comeback in recent times. Virtue ethics is usually associated with Aristotle and his 
teachings. As the name of the theory itself implies, the main concern of virtue ethicists lies 
in the virtues. The virtues can be understood as the powers of a human being to reach their 
full flourishing. The approach of virtue ethics takes into account the entire essence of a 
human being – it is oriented towards the wholeness. 
Although the three approaches have immense differences in their main clauses, their aim is 
broadly still the same: it is to clarify the groundings of morality. This aim of a theoretical 
kind consists of answering the question on the essence of morality. The general aim of 
these distinct approaches is the same, but their views on the essence of morality differ. 
Related to this theoretical kind of aim, the practical aim of moral theories is to show to the 
individuals as well as to the societies as a whole what it takes to live morally. The moral 
life is believed to lead to the good one, but the good life must not be understood in terms of 
happy life as is usual for common sense. Rather, the good life can be understood in terms 
of the right way of living. The principle-based moral theories appoint the principles that 
one needs to follow in order to reach the good life, but they understand the good life in 
different ways.  
Recently, parallel to the revival of virtue ethics, utilitarianism and Kantianism have been 
questioned. One point of critique of the latter theories is concerned with their practical aim: 
do their teachings really have a practical role to play in our lives? Susan Wolf is one of the 
contemporary philosophers, who has indicated some problems with these two traditional 
approaches. Her most famous writing that questions the relationship between theory and 
practice is the article “Moral Saints”, published in 1982. Moral saints are the moral agents 
who live in perfect accordance with the principle-based moral theories. With the 
characterization of the moral saint Wolf wants to show that the utmost moral, on the one, 
and the good life according to common understanding, on the other hand, might not be 
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4 
compatible. Her article was rather sensational in the time written, and the discussion still 
continues.  
In her article Wolf brings out two areas of concern. One area of concern is the relationship 
between the prescriptions of principle-based moral theories1 and their accordance with real 
life. In short, the problem can be seen as an incompatibility between the ideals of theory 
and the ideals of practice. One can question whether moral theories demand more of us 
than really is good for us? Is the ideal way of living according to moral theories not the life 
that we would want to pursue, even if we were living in perfect accordance with morality 
according to our standards? In other words, it might not always be ‘better to be morally 
better’ (Wolf 1982: 438). Ethics belongs to the sphere of practical philosophy but 
paradoxically the theories of ethics may turn out to be not that practical after all. 
For Wolf, the main difficulty appears to be the way moral theories like Kantianism and 
utilitarianism overemphasize the role of morality: they issue from one leading principal 
and one kind of leading values. Morality becomes dominating in the lives lived according 
to these moral theories. The characterization of moral saints is not attractive. Instead of 
being tempting, they look rather dull and unappealing. According to Wolf, the lives that 
moral saints live are devoted to morality to a degree so extreme that aspects standing 
outside of the moral sphere are excluded in the end. It is hard to see how our lives could 
benefit from such an extreme degree of morality. A life can be a good one and an 
individual can be praiseworthy also when morality does not single-handedly dominate. As 
Wolf writes: “a person may be perfectly wonderful without being perfectly moral” (1982: 
436). 
There is another set of questions closely related to the previous ones. This is not so much 
about the outcome of living according to the moral theories, but more about the possibility 
of capturing all the facets of the good life inside a single theory. If moral theories try to 
clarify the groundings of morality and thus reach the essence of the good life, then maybe 
the task that they take up is a bit too ambitious? Is it possible to comprehend the essence of 
the good life just from one – in the case of moral theories from the moral – perspective? As 
vigorously as moral theories would try to avoid it, they would still always look at life from 
the moral point of view and thus appoint the dominating role to morality. 
                                                
1 Here and further on with the general term ‘moral theories’ I refer to the theories that Wolf criticizes – 
Kantianism and utilitarianism. That is, the theories that put down a leading principle that we should follow. 
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Wolf claims that exaggerating the scope of moral theories is a common mistake. A theory 
that issues from one leading principle, however comprehensive it may be, always takes a 
look at any given phenomena from a limited perspective. According to Wolf, it is usual 
among moral theorists to try to capture the values and ideals in one single system. But 
there is also another possibility. Instead of looking for a single comprehensive system, one 
can include different viewpoints. Somehow, when ideals and the good life are in question, 
moral theorists tend to stick to only one system and a single point of view. But in life, there 
are several aspects that are important to us that are not in contrast with morality, but might 
not just belong to the moral sphere. These joys and sorrows of our life are non-, not 
immoral and can well be part of the good life. Affirming a moral theory must not 
necessarily involve accepting solely one point of view and one ideal. 
The problem that I am mainly interested in arises in this second area of concerns. It is 
concerned with the idealization of one viewpoint and thus also with the idealization of one 
aspect in our lives. It seems that if we follow the ideals of moral theories, we end up with 
the maximization of morality. According to Kantianism and utilitarianism, morality should 
play a dominant role in our lives. But if this life constructed by moral theories seems 
strangely barren and unjustified, then the maximization of morality as a means for reaching 
the good life in the so-called real world becomes questionable as well. It is questionable 
whether one single principle promoting one single set of values can lead us to the life that 
is good for us. 
Can it be that instead of maximizing a certain aspect we should try to look for a balance 
between different aspects that belong to different spheres of our lives? The claim might not 
sound striking, but if we look at the balance that we are seeking as a maximum itself, 
several philosophically interesting questions arise. First, what kinds of aspects are balanced 
in this maximum: do they still belong to the same hierarchical – i.e. moral – system? If we 
recall Wolf’s concerns about the possibility of capturing the essence of a good life inside 
one comprehensive theory, then it looks doubtful. Second, there is a question of the 
viewpoints that are important when talking about the good life. If we accept Wolf’s claim 
and take into account different points of view and aspects in our search for the good life, 
then what kind of viewpoints and aspects are we talking about? Wolf claims that also 
having a meaning is important for the good life, but how should we capture this 
meaningfulness and how should we decide whether a certain life is a meaningful one? 
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What provides us with the objective dimension in our evaluation? Finally, there is a 
challenge concerning the role of morality and moral values in the good life: are moral 
values still leading but balanced with other kind of values that keep them from dominating 
our lives? 
These questions are important as we are pursuing the clarification of what it takes to live 
well. In addition, these questions are interesting given the contemporary debate in moral 
philosophy. The classical moral theories are being questioned and with that it can also be 
said that the groundings of morality are at least partly shaken. If it were possible to bring 
moral theories and their ideals closer to common view and common morality, then maybe 
the groundings of everyday morality would also become more solid. By strengthening the 
theories and their acceptance, we also strengthen the practical implications of them. All in 
all, if we still admit that one aim of moral theories is to help us to live good, then bringing 
moral theories closer to the so-called real world will only help them to achieve their aim. 
In a nutshell, the general problem of my thesis is concerned with the role of morality in 
life. If we agree with Wolf about principle-based moral theories leading us to the ideals 
that are not our ideals, then can moral values keep their position as the most important ones 
in the hierarchy of values? Maybe we can reach the good life when we look for a balance 
between different aspects of our lives as a maximum instead of maximizing one single 
principle and one set of values in our lives. When the latter holds, is there a hierarchy of 
values in the first place? In order to find answers to these questions, I will take the 
following steps. 
In the first chapter of my thesis I will give an overview of the concept of the moral saint by 
Wolf. There, my main aim is to explain why, according to Wolf, the character of moral 
saints is not the one we would want to have and their life not the one we would want to 
live. I will bring out the pros and cons of being a moral saint and explain the shortcomings 
of their lives. Also, I will find out whether Wolf gives an indication of what the good life 
could look like in her view. 
In the second chapter, I will turn to the critics of Wolf. I will consider the arguments stated 
by Vanessa Carbonell and Robert M. Adams. I will defend Wolf against their critique and 
if not vindicate then at least show how this critique misses the point that Wolf wants to 
make in her article. In addition to accepting Wolf’s ideas, I will also go further and start 
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looking at the questions that Wolf leaves explicitly unanswered. How could the good life 
be possibly captured? What kind of theory – if any – could adequately provide us with the 
clarification of the essence of the good life? Can it be that the good life is about finding the 
balance as a maximum, not maximizing a certain aspect? 
In the final chapter of my thesis I will test the last hypothesis by responding to the 
questions stated earlier. First, if we accept Wolf’s claims concerning the character and life 
of the moral saint, then what kind of approach should we take to the good life: is this 
approach compatible with relativism or pluralism? Furthermore, do the aspects balanced in 
good life still belong to the same hierarchical system? Finally, what is the role of moral 
values in the concept of the good life? I believe that adequate answers to these questions 
take us a step closer to the clarification of the good life as well as to the explanation of the 
role of morality in it. 
I would like to thank my supervisor prof. Margit Sutrop for encouraging me to study 
further Susan Wolf’s interesting and down-to-earth approach to the good life written in an 
utmost enjoyable and fascinating style. The conversations with my supervisor were thought 
provoking and helped me to grasp the bigger picture of the problems asserted by Wolf. 
   
                                                                                                              Ross, Good life 
 
 
8 
1. Susan Wolf: moral saints and the good life  
Wolf focuses in her article “Moral Saints” (1982) on two basic questions: what kind of 
people we would like to be and what kind of lives we would want to live? One of her aims 
is to show that despite of the outlook of popular normative moral theories, in real life we 
seem to care about many non-moral aspects in addition to the moral ones. As Wolf writes: 
“moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal 
well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human 
being to strive” (1982: 419). According to Wolf, the life of moral saints is dominated by 
morality. But the life dominated solely by morality might not be the life we prefer or desire 
to live – the life that we value the highest.  
In this chapter, I will examine Wolf’s characterization of moral saints and show what Wolf 
understands by good life, when this is not the life dedicated to morality. I will find out why 
it is, according to Wolf, that a life can be perfectly wonderful without being perfectly 
moral. In order to examine Wolf’s moral saints thoroughly, I will take the following three 
steps. First, I will introduce a person whom Wolf would call a moral saint. I will bring out 
the pros and cons of being a moral saint as well as refer to the main reasons why according 
to Wolf the life of a moral saint is not the life we would want to live. Secondly, I will find 
out what is missing in the life of a moral saint according to this picture. I will introduce the 
oppositions between moral and non-moral interests, values, and reasons. Also, I will 
distinguish between different points of view that one can take in order to examine the good 
life. In these oppositions, I will use some thoughts brought out earlier as the cons of being 
a moral saint, but I will also put these oppositions into a wider context of ethical theories. 
Finally, I will turn to the question concerning the good life. I will study further what does it 
mean to live a well-rounded life according to Wolf and what is the category of 
meaningfulness that she adds to our evaluation. 
1.1 The	  life	  of	  moral	  saints	  
The concept of the moral saint largely speaks for itself. Moral saints fulfil the 
conditions of sainthood from the moral perspective: they live a morally perfect or a 
perfectly moral life. In this section I will clarify the essence of moral saints in more detail. 
I will first explain what kind of character and what kind of life in general Wolf has in 
mind, when writing about moral saints. Further on, in the following subsections, I will 
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divide their character traits and different aspects of their life in two, according to their 
attractiveness to us. 
First of all, Wolf emphasizes that a moral saint’s actions are always compatible with 
morality. Wolf introduces us to a moral saint who is “a person whose every action is as 
morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be” (1982: 
419). There is a difference whether one’s actions are in accordance with morality or one’s 
actions are as good as possible. In the case of moral saints, it seems that mere compatibility 
is not enough. It looks like moral saints must always act in accordance with morality until 
reaching or even surpassing its limits.  
One can question Wolf’s understanding that principle-based moral theories incite everyone 
to be moral saints. Indeed, these theories do not claim that everyone should be as morally 
worthy as she can in terms of devoting all the life to morality: neither Kantians nor 
utilitarians claim that our lives should be filled only with morality. Rather, it is that in our 
decision making processes and actions we should first of all take into consideration the 
principles provided by the theories. These principles lead us to the life that is good to live. 
Also, there can be a difference between lives that are lived morally perfect or perfectly 
moral: one can live a morally perfect life without being only occupied with moral issues. 
Wolf seems to equate the two although her critique goes mainly against the perfectly moral 
life – i.e. the life that is filled solely with morality.  
Although Wolf may go too extreme with her claims about the ideals of traditional moral 
theories, her critique still casts a shadow to these theories. Even if principle-based moral 
theories do not explicitly claim that we have to live a life filled with morality alone, they 
also do not explicitly set limits to how far it is good to be moral – until how far should one 
go in following the principles. If the principles lead us to the good life, why should we not 
maximize them? Principle-based moral theories do not claim that we should maximize the 
principles, but they also do not claim the opposite nor set any explicit limits2. Even if the 
picture of moral saints provided by Wolf is over-exaggerated, the question concerning the 
maximizing the moral principles is relevant. 
                                                
2 They may decline from doing so because in this case their general approach and basing upon principles may 
turn out to be questionable. The problem is that in this case, the principles might loose their supremacy, 
because they might not single-handedly lead to the right way of living anymore. 
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The question concerning the maximizing of morality and moral principles can be 
understood in terms of supererogation. In other words, the question is about what can 
morality demand from us, on the one hand, and from what point on can our actions be 
considered as going beyond its limits, on the other? If we are about to be perfectly moral, 
should the supererogatory acts also belong to our everyday reality? Wolf does not say that 
explicitly. But if we think about moral saints as persons who are ‘as morally worthy as can 
be’, it seems to imply that supererogatory acts belong to the life of a moral saint – at least 
partly, if not fully. First of all, there is a question whether supererogation is something that 
morality demands from all of us – is this what we should strive for? Even if principle-
based moral theories have not claimed that everyone should be a moral saint, following the 
moral principles seems to lead to this outcome. If one is acting moral, then one follows the 
principles and since there is no certain limit, it seems that one can easily end up with 
maximizing the principles and morality. Second of all, there is a question how to 
distinguish between morally right and morally supererogatory acts? Can one say that there 
is a line, which designates the acts that go beyond moral sphere?  
The answers to the latter questions depend upon how we understand the concept of 
supererogation. As David Heyd (2011) points out in his compendious article about 
supererogation in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, nowadays there are several ways 
that one can understand the concept of supererogation. But more or less everyone agrees 
that supererogatory actions are the ones that are morally good, but might not be strictly 
required. J. O. Urmson (1958) was the first philosopher to articulate the problem of the 
demands of morality: what rules should be included in the moral code and be mandatory to 
follow by everybody? According to Urmson the moral code “should distinguish between 
basic rules, summarily set forth in simple rules and binding on all, and the higher flights of 
morality of which saintliness and heroism are outstanding examples” (ibid: 211).  
In the context of moral saints, there is a tension concerning the supererogatory acts. If we 
should maximize morality in terms of following the moral principles to the utmost limit as 
moral saints do, is there really an upper limit of morality for us? Wolf seems to argue that 
in the case of moral saints, there is no upper limit – moral saints even sacrifice their “other 
interests for the interest in morality” (Wolf 1982: 424). We can explain this claim by 
referring to the absence of the explicit limit of following the moral principles. Wolf claims 
that if we want people to live lives that are not dominated by morality in a sense of being 
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filled with morality, “then any plausible moral theory must make use of some conception 
of supererogation” (1982: 438). Thus, if moral theories were to accept Wolf’s critique and 
understand that their ideal characters – moral saints – might not be the ideal characters for 
actual people, then there should be some actions that in a certain situation are considered to 
across the upper line of what morality demands of us. These actions are morally good, but 
not mandatory. If the ideal characters of moral theories do not recognize the upper limit, 
then ideally we as well should not recognize it. In the case of moral sainthood, one devotes 
to morality without further questions. 
But solely acting according to the moral principles does not seem to be enough for being 
moral. Being moral also implies that one understands the importance of morality and 
goodness in play. Relevant are not merely the actions of moral saints, their thoughts and 
intentions should be moral ones as well. Wolf describes moral saints as “patient, 
considerate, even-tempered, hospitable, charitable in thought as well as in deed” (1982: 
421). Moral saint’s thoughts and actions have to be in accordance with one another. This is 
analogical to the way we understand virtues. In some general way virtues are always 
beneficial (Foot 1997: 164). Aristotle, in his I Book of Nicomachean Ethics, describes 
virtues as belonging to the virtuous activity. Indeed, in order to be beneficial, virtues must 
be acted out, not merely be possessed. But virtues are not only external behaviour, but also 
the inner disposition – inner quality. Virtue is a character trait that can be understood in 
terms of a strong disposition to be and act in a certain way (Hursthouse 2012). Virtues 
must ‘engage the will’ (Foot 1997: 169). Moral saint’s thoughts as well as actions need to 
be in accordance with morality – they are good in thought and deed. This can also be seen 
as the essence of being moral without applying any certain moral theory yet.3  
Furthermore, ignorance as such is absent in moral saint’s life. It can be understood in the 
way moral saint needs to realize and understand the importance of morality and goodness – 
ignorance towards morally important aspects of life contravenes the moral grain. One 
                                                
3 Wolf seems to be inclined towards virtue ethics rather than principle-based moral theories. She does not 
look at moral saints in the light of virtue ethics. One reason for this can be that virtues seem to form the 
essential part of being moral: we do not take a person who acts according to principles, but does that without 
any understanding of what the principles stand for or why one’s actions are good, to be morally worthy. 
Basically any approach to morality must take use of the virtues at least to some extent. Another reason why 
Wolf is more in approval of virtue ethics can be that in the case of virtues, we are already talking about the 
middle-way between two extremes. It is harder to interpret virtue ethics in terms of maximizing the morality 
as one aspect of our lives because virtue ethics emphasizes the role of the wholeness. In this sense virtue 
ethics is more compatible with Wolf’s views than principle-based moral theories. In addition, as we will see 
later, Wolf also emphasizes the well-roundedness as one feature of the good life. 
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certainly cannot be ignorant towards moral principles. Also, Wolf claims that the life of a 
moral saint needs to be “dominated by the commitment of improving the welfare of others 
or of society as a whole” (1982: 420). A moral saint cannot be ignorant towards other 
people – other persons must belong to their sphere of concern. Indeed, when thinking about 
a life dominated by morality, taking care of the well-being of others seems to constitute an 
essential part of it. It is generally agreed that morality is about what one can do for others, 
not merely what one can do for oneself.  
In addition, Wolf specifies the essence of being moral according to utilitarianism and 
Kantianism. For utilitarians, morality is about the general happiness. According to J. S. 
Mill, the highest pleasure and thus also the ultimate end is happiness, as he states in the 
Greatest Happiness Principle: „actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness“ (U, II, 2). Acting 
morally is acting in a way that produces more happiness. A utilitarian moral saint should 
always perform actions that promote happiness – that is roughly the actions that are 
pleasurable. If one is as morally worthy as can be, then one needs to produce as much 
happiness as possible. That is, produce as much pleasure as possible. This is the saint that 
we can call a loving one.  
The Loving Saint by Wolf carries out these utilitarian criterions. The Loving Saint’s own 
happiness depends upon the happiness of others – she devotes herself to others gladly and 
with an open heart (Wolf 1982: 420). She is motivated by the amount of happiness that she 
produces in the world – through the latter she makes the world a more moral and a better 
place in which to live. The Loving Saint loves and helps others, because this is what she 
understands to be morally the best: the happier the others, the happier the saint. Altogether, 
the larger amount of happiness produced, the better. The Loving Saint should be the ideal 
of utilitarian moral theory. She should be posed as a role model for others to aspire to. The 
Loving Saint is the “saint out of love” (ibid). 
Alternatively, one can be a moral saint also according to Kantian point of view. Put simply, 
what constitutes morality for Kantians is a set of principles that are universal and that need 
to be acted upon. One needs to be ready to make the claims of morality to others and to 
oneself. Christine Korsgaard (1996: 19–20), a well-known contemporary Kantian, 
describes Kantian understanding of moral law as being the law of an agent’s own will. 
According to Korsgaard, moral claims have a normative force upon moral agents because a 
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moral agent is capable of reflecting her own actions self-consciously. This, together with 
moral law as a law of agent’s own will, gives a moral agent an authority over herself. Our 
actions are truly good as long as we carry them out because of the duty we feel. According 
to Kantians, reasoning and the duty to obey the law is most important, not just the good 
will, love, or general happiness. As I. Kant writes:  
It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic 
good will, or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet the true moral maxim of 
our conduct which is suitable to our position amongst rational beings as men. (2013 
[1788]: 183) 
In terms of Wolf (1982: 420), this is the description of a rational saint. The Rational Saint 
sacrifices her own interests and her own happiness in the name of others, meanwhile being 
aware of the sacrifice. The set of principles needs to be acted upon. Although the Rational 
Saint is aware of the sacrifice she takes, she still acts upon the principles – the principles 
have become the laws of her own will. The Rational Saint is motivated by the moral law 
and by the duty to execute and fulfil it – this is how she reasons her way to morality. 
Acting according to and taking the moral law as one’s own is something to which Kantians 
appeal. The Rational Saint described by Wolf fulfils the requirements of Kantians: she 
reflects upon her own actions and enforces the moral law upon herself as the law of her 
own will. The Rational Saint is doing the latter two to the utmost level and is thus, 
according to Kantians, as morally worthy as can be. The Rational Saint is the ‘saint out of 
duty’ (ibid). 
All in all, even though the two types of saints have distinct reasoning and motives for 
devoting themselves to morality, it is important that they both are moral saints. In their 
descriptions, what is dominating is not the perspective from which they understand 
morality, but the fact that they try to be as morally worthy as they can by following the 
principles: “the shared content of what these individuals are motivated to be – namely as 
morally good as possible – would play a dominant role in the determination of their 
characters” (Wolf 1982: 420). Regardless of which moral theory one supports, the core 
character of a moral saint remains the same. Moral saints represent both Kantian and 
utilitarian moral theories: they represent an ideal of how one should live when a single 
principle can lead one to the good life. Both the Rational and the Loving Saint are moral 
ones and their lives are perfectly moral either by reference to the moral law or by reference 
                                                                                                              Ross, Good life 
 
 
14 
to the best consequences. Next, I will point out the positive and negative aspects of being a 
moral saint. 
1.1.1 Pros	  
In Wolf’s description, the list of the pros of being a moral saint falls rather short. 
Goodness seems to be the main and basically the only positive feature they have to their 
name. This is what we love about them: moral saints are good. As Wolf describes them: 
“above all, a moral saint must have and cultivate those qualities which are apt to allow him 
to treat others as justly and kindly as possible” (1982: 421). Moral saints possess virtues 
that we appreciate: they are kind, honest, open- and goodhearted, helpful, charitable, etc. 
One can always trust them, without fearing that moral saints would deceive, lie, or wish 
one evil. If there is only room for morality in one’s life, there cannot be room for anything 
at odds with it.  
1.1.2 Cons	  
Even if moral saints may seem attractive at first glance, their charm may fade away 
quicker than expected. Naturally, there rises a question of who would reject a person who 
is the embodiment of goodness? What are the cons in their lives that diminish the appeal of 
moral saints so badly? I will answer the questions by examining three aspects of moral 
saints and their lives: their interests, virtues, and desires. Finally, I will connect these three 
and take a look at how they influence moral saints’ own well-being. 
First, let us have a look at the interests of moral saints. Moral saints should always deal 
with things concerned with morality, since as said before, their every action is as morally 
worthy as can be. Thus, interests of moral saints should also be of this kind – they should 
have moral interests instead of non-moral ones. As moral saints devote themselves to 
morality and to the improvement of the welfare of others, their other interests – i.e. non-
moral interests – are limited, to put it mildly. There are always people whose welfare can 
be improved. As Wolf writes:  
For the moral saint, the promotion of the welfare of others might play the role that is 
played for most of us by the enjoyment of material comforts, the opportunity to 
engage in the intellectual and physical activities of our choice, and the love, respect, 
and companionship of people whom we love, respect, and enjoy. (1982: 420) 
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A moral saint’s moral interests alone are at odds with the interests that we usually have, 
and that belong to the non-moral sphere. We are engaged with diverse activities because 
we like and enjoy doing them, not because they always improve the welfare of others. It 
seems that restricting one’s interests to morally praiseworthy matters alone is not 
something we want from life. When thinking about children’s hobby groups, we can name 
tennis, horse-back-riding, basketball, dancing, drawing, singing, piano playing. However, 
there is no ‘doing-only-morally-important-things’ hobby group in the list. If we voluntarily 
raise our children in a non-moral spirit, then how could we fool ourselves into believing 
that we would want to live a fixedly moral life? It is important to understand that doing 
non-moral things does not equal with doing things that go against morality. We do not 
approve the latter, but we seem to be on approval of the former. Without the non-moral 
sphere our lives seem limited. 
One might ask: why should a moral saint only have the interests concerned with morality? 
After all, as said previously, having non-moral hobbies does not mean having hobbies that 
go against morality. Wolf (1982: 421) admits that there is nothing fundamentally wrong 
with moral saints playing a piano or reading a novel, but the problem is practical – namely, 
the lack of time. Time is something that most of us are often short of and a moral saint is 
no exception here. Helping others is not just one action that you come across. It is a 
process that seems to be never-ending. If one is a moral saint, then one just does not have 
time for hobbies and interests unrelated to morality. There is a practical reason why a 
moral saint cannot deal with things outside morality. 
Second, important are the virtues of moral saints – more precisely the amount and the 
extent of the virtues that moral saints possess. There are different character traits – e.g. 
goodness, open-mindedness, kindness, honesty, courage, and wisdom – that are usually 
understood as essential parts of a virtuous person. According to Aristotle, there are moral 
and intellectual virtues corresponding to the division of the soul: “Some forms of virtue are 
called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues: Wisdom or Intelligence and Prudence are 
intellectual, Liberality and Temperance are moral virtues” (NE, 1103a). As we already 
saw, in the case of moral saints, the focus is by and large on moral virtues. If one is a moral 
saint, then one needs to be morally as virtuous as possible. But intellectual virtues play an 
important role as well, since a truly virtuous person needs to have practical wisdom: 
“whereas if a man of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence, then he excels in 
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conduct, and the disposition which previously only resembled Virtue will now be Virtue in 
the true sense” (NE, 1144b). That means that in order for ethical virtues to be fully 
developed, they need to be combined with practical wisdom (Kraut 2010). A moral saint is 
maximally good, honest, open-hearted, compassionate, patient, etc., but also intelligent, in 
order to have these ethical virtues flourish fully. 
There are two problems with being maximally virtuous. One problem with this particular 
feature of moral saints can be seen as being ‘too good’. Moral saint’s moral virtues are 
maximized and a person who is always as good, as kind, as compassionate as can be may 
just become a bit irritating to have around, or, as Wolf (1982: 421) claims a ‘blessing to be 
absent’. One reason why a moral saint may be unattractive is that she “will have the 
standard moral virtues to a nonstandard degree” (ibid). Another problem concerning moral 
saint’s virtues is that there is no room for certain type of other character traits that we 
value. There are character traits that we admire, but that are not strictly speaking 
compatible with moral virtues. For instance, Wolf talks about black humour, cynicism, and 
sarcasm that are at odds with moral saint’s character, because they are “going against the 
moral grain” (ibid: 422). For instance, enjoying black humour is incompatible with being 
fully morally virtuous. Wolf (ibid: 421) calls it a logical reason. In order to laugh at black 
humour, and not to mention to make the jokes of this sort, one needs to “take an attitude of 
resignation and pessimism toward the flaws and vices to be found in the world” (ibid: 422). 
One should not allow oneself even a single glance of negative attitude towards others, if 
one is to be a moral saint. But often in life, having a laugh at misfortune is exactly what 
most of us need in a hopeless situation. 
A moral saint’s next unattractive aspect is related to the two previous interests and virtues 
and is concerned with moral saint’s desires. Namely, just as a moral saint’s interests, her 
desires need to be moral ones and compatible with moral virtues as well. Furthermore, a 
true moral saint should really desire only one thing – to be as morally worthy as possible. 
Wolf describes this desire of a moral saint as being “apt to have the character not just of a 
stronger, but of a higher desire, which does not merely successfully compete with one’s 
other desires but which rather subsumes or demotes them” (1982: 424). The non-moral 
desires are a matter of choice, but the desires whose object is morality itself, are more 
imperative in nature (ibid). These claims of Wolf can be interpreted in the light of 
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maximizing the realizing of moral principles. The problem seems to lie again in the 
absence of the limit for following these principles.  
In addition, the idea itself – morality being an object of desire – seems to be an odd one. 
Morality is not something we usually desire: it is hard to see morality as the object of our 
aspirations or passions. The desire for morality might not be the appreciation of morality 
itself after all. As Wolf (1982: 424) points out, the desire of morality can rather be 
understood as the comprehension of the triviality of our other desires. In this light, instead 
of having a single desire towards morality, moral saints see that other desires are just not 
worth pursuing. This conflicts with our everyday understanding of what is desirable. Sure, 
it is generally known that matters related to morality are desirable, but we also desire 
things that stand outside the moral sphere. For instance, I can desire to master the art of 
playing piano, although the object of this desire does not promote morality. Playing the 
piano is a non-moral action, but for those who do, it is a desire worth having and an object 
worth pursuing. 
Finally, from a moral saint’s own perspective, we can ask whether being a moral saint is 
good for her own well-being. If she is always worrying about and taking care of others, 
then she might easily overlook herself and her own needs. Besides moral aspects and 
necessary needs, our well-being is dependent upon non-moral aspects as well. Well-being 
is also about the things we love to do. If someone were to tell me that I could not read 
books, listen to music, go to concerts, or do sports anymore, then I would probably feel 
that my self-realization is constrained and well-being diminished. I reckon that this is what 
moral saints have to deal with on a daily basis. As Wolf writes “if the moral saint is 
devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, 
then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving his 
backhand” (1982: 421).  
Wolf does not argue against being a moral saint merely on subjective grounds. She also 
brings in two conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to live a good life – Wolf claims 
that the good life is the life that is well-rounded and meaningful. These two features can be 
seen as objective characteristics of the good life. In short, with the well-rounded life Wolf 
has in mind the life that is not dominated by one single aspect. By the condition of 
meaningfulness, Wolf refers to the need of worthwhile projects in our lives in order for the 
lives to be the good ones. As Wolf writes:  
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[a] person’s life can be meaningful only if she cares fairly deeply about some thing or 
things, only if she is gripped, excited, interested, engaged, or (…) if she lives 
something – as opposed to being bored by or alienated from most or all that she does 
(…) One must be able to be in some sort of relationship with the valuable object of 
one’s attention – to create it, protect it, promote it, honour it, or more generally, to 
actively affirm it in some way or the other. (2010: 9–10) 
According to Wolf, “meaningfulness deserves to be included in a conception of a fully 
successful human life” (2010: 32). This gives another perspective to the good life. In other 
words, what provides us with the meaning is love and acting out of love.4 The meaning 
“comes from active engagement in projects of worth, which links us to our world in a 
positive way” (ibid: 58) and “is one ingredient of a good life” (ibid: 52). The 
meaningfulness “allows us to see our lives as having a point and a value even when we 
take an external perspective on ourselves” (ibid: 58), but it is “a type of value distinct both 
from morality and self-interest” (ibid: 63).5  
We can make a distinction between the good life understood merely in terms of happy life 
and the good life understood in terms of the meaningful life. With the good life, Wolf does 
not mean the life that is full of subjective happiness and pleasures. She does not argue 
against principle-based moral theories on the basis of subjective happiness that the 
teachings of these theories fall short to provide us with. In this case, it would also become 
questionable as to whether Wolf’s conception of the good life might be compatible with 
utilitarianism after all. Rather, Wolf’s critique against principle-based moral theories can 
be seen as indicating the limitedness of these theories. In general it seems that morality 
could be able to provide us with the meaning in life. Put simply, the principle-based moral 
theories tell us what kind of final goals we should follow in order to live well in terms of 
living meaningful: if we follow the principles, we may reach a meaningful life. But the 
problem is that we end up again with the maximizing. Wolf argues that there are more 
things in our life that are important to us and more things that can make the life 
meaningful.  
                                                
4 Still, we should be careful about understanding one’s love or care for something or somebody in terms of 
gaining merit – in this case gaining the meaning in life. As Wolf writes in an article “Self-interest and 
interests in selves” (1986: 719): “The idea of a world in which people loved (or thought that they ought to 
love) exclusively on the basis of merit is in fact rather horrifying.” In short, there must be no specific reason 
– and maybe we even do not want reason to govern here – why to love or care about something or someone. 
5 Wolf also refers to Harry Frankfurt, who argues in his book The Reasons of Love (2009) that pursuing what 
we care about – what we love – leads us to the feeling of fulfillment. As we see later, the latter is also an 
important component of good life according to Wolf. 
                                                                                                              Ross, Good life 
 
 
19 
Although meaning is important, it should not override the condition of well-roundedness in 
the good life. It seems that different aspects should be balanced, not put into a strict 
hierarchical system. Wolf brings in the category of meaningfulness in her later writings 
and does not explain its relationship with the well-roundedness that she mentions in 
“Moral Saints”. One possibility is to interpret the meaningfulness as providing the well-
rounded life with a focus. I will turn to the explanation of the well-rounded and meaningful 
life in more detail in the subsection 1.3 The good life: well-rounded and meaningful. For 
now it is important to keep in mind that Wolf does not take into consideration merely the 
subjective perspective. 
1.2 The	  shortcomings	  
In the light of the cons of being a moral saint, the life of moral saints seems to be 
perfectly moral, but strangely restricted. In this subsection I will examine the shortcomings 
of moral saint’s life in a wider context by bringing out the opposition between moral and 
non-moral interests, values, and reasons as well as the tensions between different points of 
view. These oppositions will help me clarify the shortcomings of the life of moral saints, 
on the one hand, and the content of good life according to Wolf, on the other. First, I will 
examine why the interests, values, and reasons of moral saints seem too limited for us. 
Second, I will look at this incompatibility between the moral theories and our ideals in the 
light of different viewpoints: the moral and the non-moral one. I will bring out the common 
dichotomy between the moral and the personal point of view, but I will also describe 
Wolf’s approach to the question by considering the point of view of individual perfection. 
1.2.1 Moral	  vs	  non-­‐moral	  interests,	  values,	  and	  reasons	  
A moral saint is always living up to or even above the moral standards. As we saw in 
chapter 1.1.2 Cons, this may imply that moral saint’s sphere of interests is limited just with 
morality. But dealing with moral interests and hobbies alone is usually not enough for us. 
We also appreciate interests of non-moral kind. Multiple non-moral interests and activities 
might not be necessary for good life, but “a life in which none of these possible aspects of 
character are developed may seem to be a life strangely barren” (Wolf 1982: 421). When 
we follow the common sense understanding of worthwhile interests, then the sphere of 
interests is not limited to moral ones alone. There are interests that are related to values and 
desires of a non-moral kind.  
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In an article “Asymmetrical Freedom”, Wolf (1980: 152) relates our interests with our 
values and/or desires. According to her, our interests can be seen as the mirror of our 
values. There are values of different kind. To look at the bigger picture, E. J. Bond (2001: 
1745) has described values in general as something that are good to have, receive or do. In 
the context of moral theories, moral values are the ones that are important. Bond (ibid: 
1749) emphasizes the role of moral values as the basis of our social life. Moral values are 
important to what we are and how we live. They are peculiar to human beings and our way 
of life, in which morality should have a strong standing. 
It is no wonder that moral values, interests, and desires have enjoyed a fair amount of 
attention as they are being praised by moral theories. Still, there are a lot of other things in 
life that we value, despite of their non-moral nature. If we think about the role models we 
have in life, they are often related to our non-moral interests. We do not usually follow 
them because of the moral ideals they represent, but because of their other features. As 
Wolf writes:  
We may make ideals out of athletes, scholars, artists-more frivolously, out of 
cowboys, private eyes, and rock stars. We may strive for Katharine Hepburn's grace, 
Paul Newman's "cool"; we are attracted to the high-spirited passionate nature of 
Natasha Rostov; we admire the keen perceptiveness of Lambert Strether. Though there 
is certainly nothing immoral about the ideal characters or traits I have in mind, they 
cannot be superimposed upon the ideal of a moral saint. (1982: 422) 
According to Wolf, there is no wrong done when one is apt to “recognize and appreciate 
non-moral talents and skills” (1982: 425). What could be wrong about appreciating the 
things that belong to the non-moral sphere when one stays true to morality at the same 
time? As we saw in chapter 1.1.2 Cons, in the case of moral saints there appear to be a 
practical and a logical reason why moral saints cannot allow themselves to get involved 
with the non-moral sphere. In addition, Owen Flanagan has pointed out in his article 
“Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection” (1986) that there might be a conflict 
between the reasons of our non-moral and moral interests, values, and desires. As Flanagan 
puts is: 
The important idea is not merely that the ideals of morality cannot provide a 
comprehensive guide to the conduct of life, but that non-moral ideals and projects may 
be in conflict with – and not just additional to – our moral ideals. We admire lives 
constituted by traits – loving to cook, study chemistry or to play and follow sports –
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which are developed for non-moral reasons and which obstruct satisfying the ideal(s) 
of moral sainthood. (1986: 51) 
Moral saints have reasons for keeping a promise, not telling a lie, and helping others, to 
bring some examples because this is what morality demands from them, either in terms of 
the moral law or in terms of promoting general happiness. In the context of moral saints, 
moral reasons have all the glory – moral reasons play the dominating role in their 
deliberations, but in our deliberations and decisions, we usually consider both moral and 
non-moral ones. Non-moral reasons can be more closely related to our own preferences, 
interests, or as some authors argue also to our rationality6. If thinking about our lives, then 
most deliberations that we make rest upon non-moral reasons and deliberations. For 
instance, if we go out for a dinner, read a novel or have an opinion in a conflict, we have 
different reasons for different actions and the reasons are often of non-moral kind. 
Again, one can raise the question whether this is really what moral theories claim. Do 
principle-based moral theories require us to abstain from everything but morality – should 
we take into consideration only moral reasons? The aim of moral theories might not be 
leading us to the perfectly moral life, but just to the morally perfect one. But as we saw 
before, principle-based moral theories do not answer clearly to the questions concerning 
the maximizing of the realization of moral principles. Another point is that the goal of the 
moral theories may not be to determine the good life in terms of common sense, but the 
good life in terms of morality. Their goal can be seen as leading us to live in a right way. 
But even if the goal of principle-based moral theories might not be reaching the good life 
in terms of the common sense ‘happy life’, they still must acknowledge that the life where 
their principles are maximized is too extreme in order to work as an ideal.  
It seems that for moral saints, the non-moral values and reasons are not worth pursuing or 
considering. They stand outside the moral sphere and are thus left out from the moral 
saint's sphere of interest. In life we adore at least some things that belong to the non-moral 
sphere. It can be said that we “reject the thesis of the over-ridingness of the morally ideal 
because it fails to allow enough room for the development of non-moral traits and talents” 
(Flanagan 1986: 54). Probably because of the latter we also often criticize a moral saint’s 
character and life for being too one-tracked. But that does not imply that we approve the 
characters and lives from the other end of the spectrum – lives that are immoral. As 
                                                
6 See e.g. Douglas W. Portmore’s article “Imperfect reasons and rational options” (2012). 
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Flanagan proposes, we also “reject models of persons which do not make some 
accommodation to moral demands” (1986: 54). Letting non-moral aspects have standing in 
our lives does not mean that we approve immorality. Moral and non-moral aspects must 
not exclude one another. They can and usually do coexist in our lives. Also principle-based 
moral theories do not seem to deny the non-moral sphere of life. Rather, they fail to put the 
limit to the moral one. If we accept that our life consists of moral and non-moral aspects 
and one must not dominate above the other, then there should be some kind of balance 
between moral and non-moral aspects of our life. One possibility is to see this balance as 
an essential feature of the good life as this state of affairs would hold back the domination 
of either of the spheres. Next, I will look at this issue in the context of different viewpoints. 
1.2.2 Moral	  vs	  non-­‐moral	  point	  of	  view	  
It is also possible to interpret the conflict between the different concepts of the good 
life in terms of different points of view. The idea is that we can look at our lives from 
different perspectives. The distinction can be seen as a dichotomy between moral and non-
moral, impersonal and personal, universal and partial, objective and subjective viewpoints. 
These distinctions deserve attention in the context of moral saints as well: they can shed 
light upon the question as to why the life of a moral saint is not the one we would prefer. 
The decisions and actions in the life of moral saints can in all cases be understood as the 
ones made from the moral point of view. In contrast, the decisions and actions in the life 
that we would like to live can be understood as being made from some other point of view 
besides morality.  
Wolf (1982: 436-437) describes taking up the moral point of view as understanding that 
‘one is just one person among others’: one sees oneself and one’s interests on a par with 
other people. We can consider the two moral theories again. According to Kantians, one is 
acting from a moral point of view, if one is taking authority over oneself by enforcing the 
moral law upon oneself as the law of one’s own will. Wolf (1999: 205) interprets Kantian’s 
moral point of view as seeing every moral agent as equally deserving the respect and as 
being equally a subject to moral law. On the other hand, according to utilitarians, one is 
acting from a moral point of view, if one considers everyone else’s happiness as important 
as one’s own: what is important is the general happiness in the world. Wolf describes the 
utilitarian moral point of view as taking “one’s own personal point of view as just one 
among others” (ibid). There are variances in the views of Kantians and utilitarians, but they 
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share their main core of a moral point of view – they see it extracting from a personal point 
of view. As Wolf says: “The moral point of view is reached by abstracting from a point of 
view that one more naturally holds (…) We may call it the personal point of view.” (ibid: 
204) Considering other people and their interests equally with one’s own can be at odds 
with the personal point of view. The moral point of view may not be natural for us to hold, 
but something that we learn to take up, when being raised in the spirit of morality.  
The personal point of view might be harder to understand than the moral one. First of all, 
one can understand the contrasting point of view to morality as being primarily concerned 
with person’s own interests. This point of view is about what is best for oneself: “what 
makes her happiest or otherwise maximizes her own well-being” (Wolf 1999: 206). This is 
the point of view that is driven by self-interest and mainly related to the approach of 
rational egoism. Secondly, one can understand the personal point of view as the point of 
view of personal preferences. According to Wolf (ibid) this is different from the first 
approach, because in this case, the personal point of view can also reflect the interests of 
others, although through this person’s perspective whose point of view is in question. In 
other words, one can still be concerned with the well-being of her close ones. Wolf claims 
that the best, according to this approach, is “whatever the person most wants (or would 
want if she were able to see the full implications of the alternatives – and leaving morality 
to one side)” (ibid).  
These two are the most common interpretations of the personal point of view. Still, there 
are alternative approaches besides these. One of them is the point of view of individual 
perfection. Wolf uses this approach in “Moral Saints”. Wolf describes this point of view as 
“the point of view from which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, and what 
kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be” (1982: 437). In another 
article, Wolf (1999: 217) describes this point of view as providing us “with reasons 
independent of moral reasons (and not reducible to self-interested reasons) for developing 
our characters and living our lives in some ways rather than the others”. It seems that in 
this point of view, moral as well as non-moral aspects are taken into consideration – it 
includes impersonal as well as personal, objective as well as subjective, universal as well 
as partial. We do care about ourselves and about our own personal interests, but we also 
want to see our lives from some detached perspective (Wolf 2010: 28). In the point of view 
of individual perfection, the moral and the non-moral are united.  
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It does not seem that Wolf aims at the exclusion of the personal point of view from the 
good life. Rather, she binds other perspectives with it. In the context of the good life, the 
moral point of view is concerned with the question of how to live morally. The personal 
point of view deals with the question of how to live in the way best for oneself or one’s 
own preferences. The main reason why the life of moral saints does not seem perfect lies in 
the battle between the moral and the personal point of view. We can see here the 
connection with the second concern of Wolf – the scope of moral theories. If moral 
theories remain true to the moral point of view, they cannot comprehend all the facets of 
our lives. Traditional moral theories do not adequately comprehend the whole of our lives, 
but just the moral domain – the moral sphere. The point of view of individual perfection, 
on the other hand, accommodates both – it puts weight on moral as well as non-moral 
aspects. This leads us to the following question: what life is a good one according to Wolf? 
Next, I will clarify how Wolf sees the good life in general. 
1.3 The	  good	  life:	  well-­‐rounded	  and	  meaningful	  
The point of view of individual perfection proposed by Wolf accommodates different 
viewpoints. Wolf argues that unlike the moral point of view, the point of view of 
individual perfection leaves room for multiple aspects that we consider important. 
According to Wolf, when examined from the point of view of individual perfection the 
“goodness of an individual's life does not vary proportionally with the degree to which it 
exemplifies moral goodness” (1982: 437). Thus, important is the general state of affairs in 
one’s life, not solely the moral one. But what does this general state of affairs consist of? 
What viewpoints are presented in the point of view of individual perfection? Wolf does not 
exclude the moral sphere from the good life. She claims explicitly that morality is included 
in the point of view of individual perfection although its role is limited: “the moral worth 
of an individual's relation to his world will (…) have some, but limited, value” (ibid). We 
can also look at other kinds of values – e.g. aesthetic, economic, cultural – and add 
corresponding viewpoints to the point of view of individual perfection without further 
trouble.  
More interesting is the question as to whether there are also other aspects that are 
important in the concept of the good life and in its evaluation – whether the point of view 
of individual perfection also includes other categories that need to be taken into 
consideration. In what follows, I will examine this in more depth. First, I will examine how 
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Wolf describes a well-rounded life that she considers to be a good one. Second, I will 
explain the role of meaningfulness in the point of view of individual perfection and in the 
good life. Wolf talks about the former in “Moral Saints”, about the latter in her more recent 
writings.  
1.3.1 A	  well-­‐rounded	  life	  
According to Wolf, the good life seems to be the life that consists of different kinds of 
aspects – both moral and non-moral ones.7 Wolf claims that the good life is a life that is 
well-rounded. To be clear, according to Wolf, a well-rounded life is a good life, but she 
does not argue for any certain approach to well-roundedness. She understands that the 
condition of well-roundedness would be too strict if filled with certain content. Then we 
would have just another moral theory that ascribes us the one certain way we should live in 
order to reach the good life. The latter is something that Wolf avoids. Thus, Wolf does not 
give a clear explanation of well-rounded life, but just some indication of what it might look 
like.8  
As already said, a well-rounded life should accommodate at least some non-moral aspects. 
According to Wolf (1982: 423), an aspiration to become as moral as possible is not the 
same as aspiration to become e.g. an Olympic swimmer or a world-famous pianist. If a 
person wants to become an Olympic swimmer, then she can sacrifice her other desires, but 
she understands that these other desires can also be worth pursuing. If a person desires to 
be as morally good as possible, then there is no room for acknowledging other desires. 
When we act in full accordance with the moral law or promote the happiness of others, 
then our conduct falls into such a broad sphere that it subsumes all aspects of our lives. 
Wolf  (ibid) does not claim that we cannot have a dominant concern when we want our life 
to be a well-rounded one, but that his dominant concern should not become imperative. 
Furthermore, one central problem for Wolf seems to lie in the fact that traditional moral 
theories understand the concept of the good life as an objective one. There is a certain way 
one should live. Wolf, on the other hand, does not agree with the purely objective account 
                                                
7 See chapter 1.2 The shortcomings. 
8 Wolf does not give good explanation though why the good life should be a well-rounded one. As we will 
see later in the last chapter of this thesis, seeing the ideal as a balance between different aspects of life can 
include well-roundedness and thus also serve better for understanding the concept of the good life. In 
addition, Wolf (1982: 423) avoids saying that well-roundedness is more of a virtue or has more of a value 
than things related to morality. Rather, she acknowledges that in the life of moral saints, morality has all the 
glory and morality does not allow any other aspects to stand beside her. 
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of the good life – or at least not with the ones that are so extreme. She seems to be inclined 
to some approach that stands in the middle of objectivity and subjectivity – there is an 
objective as well as a subjective dimension in her approach to well-roundedness. Wolf 
admits that there are some things that are usually part of a well-rounded and good life, but 
she rejects the approaches that are monist or absolute in their spirit. As Wolf writes: 
Even if responsible people could reach agreement as to what constituted good taste or 
a healthy degree of well-roundedness, for example, it seems wrong to insist that 
everyone try to achieve these things or to blame someone who fails or refuses to 
conform. (1982: 434) 
Last, Wolf (1982: 428) refers to a well-rounded life as a richer one. But she leaves the 
meaning of the latter open. Does it mean that morality and moral values unfoundedly 
restrict our lives and thus should not be seen as the most important? If principle-based 
moral theories do not do a good job in finding the good life, then what are the other 
options? Should we be inclined towards relativism or pluralism, what provides us the 
objectivity then – or is there an objective dimension after all? Wolf does not answer 
explicitly what should be the role of morality in a well-rounded and good life or what is the 
role of other values in the latter. I will turn to these questions in the last chapter of my 
thesis. Next, I will explain the role of meaning in connection with the feeling of fulfilment 
in good life. 
1.3.2 Meaningfulness	  and	  fulfilment	  
Wolf claims that one component of the good life is the meaningfulness. As said in chapter 
1.1.2 Cons, Wolf does not specify how the meaningfulness is related to the well-
roundedness. One possibility is to see the meaningfulness as giving the focus to the well-
rounded life. The well-rounded life seems to be a good one, but without more precise 
guidelines that would serve as an anchor it is easy to lose the direction. If we think about 
Kantian and utilitarian moral theories, we can see their principles as providing the focus to 
the life. The principles serve as the guidelines that one should follow in order not to get 
lost in the babel of diverse aspects that our lives consist of. The main principle can work as 
a lighthouse for the moral agent. In this sense, there might be nothing wrong with stating 
and following these principles, but the problem is that for moral saints, the main principle 
seems to have the status of the only escape from immorality. It is important to keep in 
mind the imperative nature of morality in traditional moral theories.  
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First, as we saw before, if morality is dominating, then it is hard to see one’s life as a well-
rounded one. The situation can be understood similarly in terms of the meaningfulness. If 
morality is providing one with the meaning in life, then it tends to be imperative in nature. 
The same problems that we saw concerning moral saints and their devotion to morality 
arise.9 Furthermore, concerning the meaning in life, it is important that the relationship 
between the subject and the object were active: “One must be able to be in some sort of 
relationship with the valuable object of one’s attention – to create it, protect it, promote it, 
honour it, or more generally, to actively affirm it in some way or the other.” (Wolf 2010: 
9). But having an active relationship with morality seems somehow just as odd as having 
morality as the (only) object of desire. Although the life of moral saints has a meaning, 
moral saints have desires and interests, and they are virtuous, the problem is that all these 
aspects are rooted in morality and spring from the moral sphere of life. 
Finally, an additional way to understand the connection between meaningful and well-
rounded life is to see that meaningfulness alone does not make the life good. 
Meaningfulness is one ingredient or one dimension of a good life (Wolf 2010: 51, 118). 
We should still look at the good life as a well-rounded one. The relationship between the 
meaningfulness and well-roundedness is bilateral – they complement each other. Even if 
there is one particular aspect that seems to be the most important one – that we recognize 
as giving our life a meaning – it does not mean that other aspects are unimportant. The 
aspect that gives meaning to our lives does not diminish the importance of other aspects in 
such an imperative manner.   
As it was in the case of well-roundedness, the guidelines provided by Wolf are quite fuzzy 
in the case of meaningfulness too. Even if we exclude some projects as not satisfying the 
conditions of meaningfulness10, we are still left with multiple projects that can make life 
meaningful. Important is that one is actively engaged with some project that one loves. It 
may refer again that Wolf is inclined towards some kind of subjectivism11: there are plenty 
of projects that can bring meaning to life and the meaning itself is related to the subjective 
                                                
9 See chapters 1.1.2 Cons and 1.3.1 Well-rounded life. 
10 For instance, Wolf (2010) excludes the lives of a ‘pot-smoker, goldfish-lover, or Tolstoy-copier’ from the 
meaningful ones. Even though we are usually reluctant to judge the lives of others as meaningless or not 
worthwhile, if we see that someone’s life consists of smoking pot all day long or taking care of a goldfish, 
most of us would question the worthiness of these projects. The latter also makes us question the 
meaningfulness of their lives. Since meaningfulness is one important aspect of good life, we would also be 
reluctant to consider their lives as good ones. 
11 One can also interpret these ideas of Wolf in pluralistic light as we will see later in this theses.  
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feelings of care and love. Also, the point of view of individual perfection from where we 
evaluate lives does not add much objectivity to the picture.  
In addition to meaningfulness, Wolf brings in the feeling of fulfilment. According to Wolf, 
“to find something fulfilling is (…) to find it such as to be characterizable in terms that 
would portray it as (objectively) good” (2010: 24). There is a difference whether one feels 
fulfilled by something that corresponds to a merely subjective or some objective condition. 
Even if a goldfish-lover, an all day pot-smoker, or an enthusiastic crossword-puzzle-solver, 
might feel fulfilled and in this sense their life can be considered to be meaningful, the 
“apparent condition of meaningfulness they do satisfy (…) is in a certain way defective 
and less desirable than fulfilment stemming from a more fitting or appropriate source” 
(ibid: 25).  
For Wolf, fulfilment is closely related to meaningfulness. Fulfilment emphasizes the role 
of subjectivity in a meaningful and good life, but it is not merely about this subjective 
feeling. Strictly speaking, what is valuable is not the on-going state of fulfilment – the 
pleasurable feeling – but the fact that one is constantly engaged in the projects of worth 
(Wolf 2010: 27). It is valuable that one has a meaning in life thanks to the fulfilment. In 
order to feel the fulfilment, one needs to be actively engaged with worthwhile projects.12  
Worthwhile projects are the ones that we consider to be worthwhile also from some 
external point of view. Wolf sees some objective dimension in the way we evaluate both 
the worthiness of the projects that create meaning, on the one hand, and the good life, on 
the other. According to Wolf, we are usually unsatisfied when we cannot see the project 
being worthwhile in anyone else’s eyes but ours. As Wolf writes: 
Our interest in being able to see our lives as worthwhile from some point of view 
external to ourselves, and our interest in being able to see ourselves as part of an at 
least notional community that can understand us and that to some degree shares our 
point of view, then, seem to me to be pervasive, even if not universal. (2010: 31) 
But why does Wolf bring in two different categories: why is it necessary to add the feeling 
of fulfilment to the category of meaningfulness? Why is it important to add an additional 
                                                
12 John Kekes (2008: 50–52) talks about enjoyment in life as the by-products of what we do. One of his 
points is that “we cannot make ourselves enjoy life” – we cannot achieve enjoyment “by aiming at it directly” 
(ibid: 52). Rather, if our actions and goals “are appropriate, the enjoyment of life follows” (ibid). The case of 
the feeling of fulfilment seems to be similar. One can have the feeling as a by-product of some certain action 
or of the engagement in certain projects, not make oneself to feel the fulfilment. 
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subjective feature to the picture? After all, we could see love and acting coherently for 
reasons of love as sufficient requirements for meaning in life, to paraphrase Robert M. 
Adams (2010: 76). In other words, we can also ask what is in Wolf’s reasoning the 
difference between the meaning and fulfilment? In her response to Adams, Wolf (2010: 
111–113) turns attention to the way one can love and still feel that there is something 
lacking in one’s life – there is no feeling of fulfilment. The feeling of fulfilment can be 
absent in lives filled with love.13 
The point of view of individual perfection as described by Wolf is compatible with 
meaning and fulfilment in the good life. The category of meaningfulness is about caring 
about something deeply and being actively engaged with that object. The feeling of 
fulfilment adds extra subjectivity to the picture, because it emphasizes the role of the 
subjective pleasurable feeling that one gets from this engagement. If there is a feeling of 
fulfilment in one’s life, then this is one reason why we tend to see one’s life attractive. 
Still, for both – fulfilment and meaning – there are some objective standards according to 
which we evaluate different projects. The claim that we value meaning in life rests partly 
upon the claim that we value the feeling of fulfilment. We are looking for meaning and 
fulfilment that stems from an appropriate source.  
In this chapter I analysed Wolf’s characterization of moral saints. If we try to 
picture a perfectly moral person and a perfectly moral life, then they may not seem perfect 
for us. First, I described the life of moral saints and their general character. I brought out 
the advantages and drawbacks. The former can be seen in the goodness of a moral saint, 
the latter in the limited scope of her interests and desires. Second, I explained that the 
shortcomings of moral saints occur because they abstain from non-moral interests, values, 
and reasons that are important for us. When we think about our lives, then most (if not all) 
of us have interests, virtues and desires that are of non-moral nature. We enjoy different 
hobbies and activities that do not go against the moral grain, but do not belong to the field 
of morality either. We like humorous people, who make cynical jokes about oneself and 
life in general. We pursue things that are not related to morality, but that we still find 
worthwhile to desire. A moral saint always takes up the moral point of view: she acts from 
the position that everybody should be seen as equal and treated correspondingly. Yet, in 
everyday life, we tend to prefer another – the non-moral – point of view in different 
                                                
13 Wolf gives here the examples of a housewife and soldier. It is possible that they really love, they are 
engaged actively with the object of their love, they life has meaning, but they still lack the fulfilment. 
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situations as well. This means that in our actions we usually also take into account our own 
interests or our own preferences besides the moral considerations. Wolf proposes that in 
search of the good life we evaluate our lives from the point of view of individual perfection 
instead of the moral one. Individual perfection must not be at odds with the moral point of 
view, but its scope is wider: non-moral deliberations are added to the moral ones.  
Third, I examined further what the good life according to Wolf consists of. A well-rounded 
life accommodates various aspects. The problem with the life of a moral saint seems to be 
that morality single-handedly dominates it. In principle-based ethics, it is hard to find an 
upper limit for realizing the moral principles. Moral claims seem to be imperative in nature 
and exclude other aspects from life. Although Wolf’s approach may refer to subjectivity of 
the good life, she also acknowledges some objective dimensions that are in play in the 
good life. Meaningfulness and fulfilment in life are also attached to this objectivity – we do 
not consider every project to be able to make life meaningful nor do we see every object as 
suitable for the feeling of fulfilment. Still, Wolf leaves explicitly unanswered what 
provides us with the objective dimension and what is the role of morality in the good life. I 
will turn to these questions in the third chapter of my thesis. Before this, I will consider a 
couple of critics of Wolf’s ideas.  
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2. In response to Susan Wolf  
Wolf’s account of moral saints has been criticized from different perspectives. It is fair 
to say that the main critique against Wolf’s article concerns her characterization of a moral 
saint. This is understandable, since that characterization forms the basis for Wolf’s other 
claims. Thus, in order to criticize Wolf’s claims about principle-based moral theories, one 
must bring out the mistakes in her image of moral saints. Vanessa Carbonell is a young 
philosopher, who has argued against Wolf’s way of depicting moral saints. In her article 
“What Moral Saints Look Like” (2009) Carbonell claims that the incompatibility between 
moral saints and our ideals can be surmounted. According to Carbonell, the character of 
moral saints that Wolf has painted is not accurate but self-defeating. Robert M. Adams is 
also unsatisfied with Wolf’s characterization of moral saints and he makes his critique 
clear in the article “Saints” (1984). For him, the main problem is that Wolf mixes up the 
features of moral sainthood and sainthood as such. 
In what follows, I will first introduce moral saints as Carbonell and Adams picture them 
and bring out what is wrong with Wolf’s approach according to them. I will point out two 
mistakes that Carbonell claims Wolf to have made in her reasoning. In addition, I will 
explain how according to both Carbonell and Adams the life of (moral) saints can be a 
well-rounded one. Second, I will turn to the defence of Wolf. I will show why Carbonell’s 
and Adams’ critique is questionable. 
2.1 In	   defence	   of	   (moral)	   saints:	   Vanessa	   Carbonell	   and	   Robert	   M.	  
Adams	  
As said before, Carbonell focuses her critique on the character of a moral saint and on 
our attitudes towards them. Carbonell argues that moral saints are not as unattractive as 
Wolf pictures because “moral commitments do not grossly distort an agent’s personality to 
the extent she [Wolf] proposes” (2009b: 372). What Carbonell has in mind here is that 
living the good life from the moral point view might not be in contrast with living the good 
life from the point of view of individual perfection. The moral point of view does not 
change the agent’s appeal to us so sharply. According to Carbonell, the mistake in Wolf’s 
reasoning lies in the over-exaggeration of the general aim of moral saints to be moral.14 
                                                
14 I will not study here in depth Carboenell’s (2009a, 2009b) critique concerning moral saint’s motivation. 
Her main idea is that moral saint’s motivation is de re, not de dicto motivation. In short, Carbonell claims 
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Adams, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with the distorted picture of sainthood that 
Wolf presents. He states his main concern to be “that sainthood, not Kant or utilitarianism, 
receives its due” (1984: 392). Although Adams does not argue directly against Wolf’s 
ideas concerning morality and moral ideals, it is interesting to look at his arguments. This 
gives us another perspective on the problems that Wolf is concerned about. Adams 
emphasizes the distinction between religion and morality, when recognizing the limited 
scope of the latter. In Adams’ work, we can find critique against Wolf’s ideas, but it can 
also potentially support the wider concerns of Wolf that are related to the scope of moral 
theories. In this sense we can see the two critics – Carbonell and Adams – as also 
contradicting each other. I will first introduce the moral saints according to Carbonell and 
Adams. Next, I will consider the two mistakes that Wolf makes according to Carbonell. 
Last, I will explain why, according to Carbonell and Adams, the life of a moral saint can be 
a well-rounded one after all. 
2.1.1 New	  versions	  of	  (moral)	  saints	  
The main concern of both Carbonell and Adams is related to the way Wolf describes 
moral saints and the impression they have on us. According to Wolf, moral saints are 
unattractive. According to Carbonell and Adams, one can also be a (moral) saint without 
the negative ‘side-effects’ described by Wolf. A moral saint can remain perfectly attractive 
to us. To prove their point, Carbonell and Adams give the examples of the persons whom 
we consider to be saints but whom we still admire. Carbonell introduces us to Dr Paul 
Farmer15 “who attracts friends and followers like a magnet” (2009b: 376). According to 
Carbonell, Dr Farmer “satisfies the conditions for moral sainthood” (ibid: 377) but also 
“serves as an ‘unequivocally compelling personal ideal’” (ibid).  
Adams (1984), on the other hand, uses the well-known examples of saints like St. Francis 
of Assisi, Gandhi, and Mother Theresa. Adams claims that these real life saints “are quite 
different from what Wolf thinks a moral saint would be” (1984: 392). While Carbonell 
                                                                                                                                              
that when we ask a moral saint why she acts the way she does, a moral saint refers to a certain action or aim 
that she pursues, not to morality as such. We are annoyed when moral saints talk about their good deeds and 
high morality. But if moral saint’s motivation is de re, we ourselves interpret their actions as morally good 
ones and thus they might not be unattractive. I will leave this part of her critique aside, because the way Wolf 
and Carbonell approach the question concerning the motivation is too diverse and I would say even 
incompatible with one another. Wolf talks about a moral saint’s motivation in terms of Kantianism and 
utilitarianism, Carbonell in terms of de re and de dicto motivation. 
15 Dr Paul Farmer is a real life person, who fought tuberculosis in Haiti, Peru and Russia. Carbonell’s 
description of him is based upon the book Mountains Beyond Mountains: The Quest of Dr. Paul Farmer, A 
Man Who Would Cure the World written by Tracy Kidder in 2003. This is a non-fictional biographical work 
about Dr. Farmer and his life. 
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questions Wolf’s approach to moral saints, Adams is more concerned with ‘the actuality of 
sainthood’. Adams (ibid) is worried about the fact that Wolf uses the examples of real life 
saints to talk about the moral ones. Adams is not directly concerned with the conditions of 
moral sainthood nor the unattractiveness of moral saints, but with giving fair standing to 
the actuality of sainthood.  
Carbonell does not draw a contrast between moral sainthood and sainthood as we 
understand it from the examples of the persons whom we consider to be saints. Carbonell 
(2009b: 377–378) describes Dr Farmer’s life as ascetic, but being ascetic is partly why we 
admire him. Dr Farmer is a doctor and medical anthropologist and his non-profit 
organization manages clinics that treat the world’s poorest and sickest people. Dr Farmer 
tries to help as many people as he can. At the same time he is in close contact with people 
and is compelled to make heartfelt decisions. He is not obsessed with the morality as a 
whole nor the moral goodness itself. Rather he is obsessed “about the object of his concern 
– the poor, the sick” (ibid: 379). Dr Farmer does not worry as much about how he himself 
is acting, but rather about in whose interests he is acting. 
Although Dr Farmer is busy with distributing and creating as much goodness as he can, his 
life is rarely barren. He finds pleasure in his work itself: his work provides him hobbies 
and satisfaction (Carbonell 2009b: 378). Furthermore, Carbonell (ibid: 378–379) claims 
that Dr Farmer’s life is not merely free from barriers but also flourishing. He is using his 
“talent and intellect to improve the lives of thousands of people” (ibid: 379) – this is what 
most of us would consider interesting, fulfilling, and deeply satisfying way of living. There 
are costs to this kind of living – Dr Farmer has to make sacrifices – but it is important that 
despite these costs, his life is appealing to us. Dr Farmer is “obsessed but not fanatical, 
ascetic but not self-righteous (…) he is a distinctly human moral saint (…) He proves that 
someone who exhibits all of the important features of a moral saint can be the sort of 
person we want to be.” (ibid: 380) 
Adams approaches the criteria of being a saint from a different perspective. Like 
Carbonell, Adams also rejects the demand for sainthood as being fanatical with producing 
the good. But instead of explaining this away with the help of showing the possibility for 
non-moral interests and hobbies that coincide with the activities of the saint, he refers to 
the substance of being a saint. Adams claims that “the substance of sainthood is (…) 
goodness overflowing from a boundless source” (1984: 396). One does not need to be 
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fanatic about producing the good in order to be a saint. Rather one needs to believe in the 
goodness. This goodness is present in the saints in exceptional power (ibid) and this is 
what makes them saints. According to Adams “saintliness is not perfectionism, though 
some saints have been perfectionistic in various ways” (ibid). Next, I will examine the two 
mistakes that Carbonell points out in Wolf’s reasoning. 
2.1.2 Two	  mistakes	  in	  Wolf’s	  reasoning	  
Carbonell supports her characterization of Dr Farmer as a moral saint instead of the one 
that Wolf proposes with two main claims. First, Carbonell (2009b: 381–385) criticizes the 
selection of the character traits that Wolf ascribes to moral saints. The problem is their 
overly positive attitude. In short, Carbonell claims that Wolf misunderstands what it means 
to have a generally positive attitude towards the world. For Wolf, being virtuous includes 
the positive attitude. Carbonell (ibid: 383) claims that if moral saints always remain 
positive, then they respond inadequately to some features of the world – e.g. remain 
positive and indulgent towards persons or actions that actually do not deserve this attitude. 
In order to prove her point, Carbonell focuses mainly on the virtues of charity – as being 
‘charitable in thought’ – and patience. 
Carbonell finds support from Julia Driver. In her article “The Virtues of Ignorance” (1989) 
Driver addresses the problem concerning Aristotle’s claim that a virtuous action involves 
one being aware of what one is doing, because a virtuous choice must be made based upon 
practical wisdom. Contrary to Aristotle, Driver claims that there are some virtues that 
“involve ignorance in an essential way” (1989: 374). Ignorance is understood in terms of 
being unaware of something. Driver examines the virtues of modesty and blind charity. 
Driver characterizes modesty “as a dogmatic disposition to underestimation of self-worth” 
(ibid: 378). With blind charity Driver has in mind “a disposition not to see the defects, and 
to focus on the virtues of persons” (ibid: 381). It is “charity in thought rather than charity 
in deed” (ibid). Modesty and blind charity are alike, because both of them involve being 
unaware about something. In the case of modesty this something is related to oneself, in 
the case of blind charity more to the outside world.16  
                                                
16 Although these virtues of ignorance, as Driver calls them, have ‘deficiencies’ compared to the other 
virtues, we still value them. Driver (1989: 383) provides us with three possible explanations for the latter: (1) 
there is a certain psychological state that has an intrinsic value for us, (2) there is an instrumental value due to 
these virtues because they generate good, (3) we value the psychological states but we do that for 
instrumental reasons. 
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According to Carbonell, we can think about moral saints in two ways: a moral saint as 
being blindly charitable or a moral saint as “being charitable when charity is called for” 
(2009b: 384). The first one of two fits with Wolf’s characterization of moral saints: they 
never take a negative attitude towards others. We often admire blind charity, but we admire 
it to a certain degree (ibid). If blind charity occurs in the situations where it is not deserved 
or ‘called for’, we usually disapprove it. If blind charity were always in play in the case of 
moral saints, we would not see moral saints as ideal characters. This suits well with Wolf’s 
ideas, because the blind charity of moral saints is unattractive. 
Carbonell argues against the blind charity of moral saints with reference to moral agency. 
According to Carbonell (2009b: 384), at the same time as moral saints are being as 
charitable as possible, they are also diminishing their moral agency. We can see one part of 
moral agency to be the avoidance of ignorance towards the different aspects of the actions 
that we perform.17 In the case of blind charity, moral saints are not fulfilling their role to 
the utmost degree. Since blind charity involves some ignorance, a blindly charitable moral 
saint “will be much less effective, and much less admirable, as a moral agent” (ibid). Thus, 
according to Carbonell, there is a contrast between the perfect moral agency and the 
everlasting positive attitude. Wolf’s moral saints cannot posses both. 
Carbonell (2009b: 384) offers that instead of being blindly charitable, moral saints are 
charitable only if charity is called for – only if it is warranted. According to Carbonell, this 
approach to moral saints is more plausible, because it does not diminish the role of moral 
saint’s moral agency nor their appeal to us. If moral saints are charitable only when it is 
called for, then they are not unattractive to us because of their charity. Carbonell (2009a: 
27) questions the reluctance of moral saints to make negative judgements concerning 
others. Instead of emphasizing the importance of always remaining positive, Carbonell 
emphasizes moral saint’s task of benefitting others. We expect moral saints to turn their 
attention to the ones who need as well as deserve their help. Otherwise, when helping 
people whose intentions are not good, the actions of a moral saint might bring about 
exactly the opposite of goodness. Blind charity can work against a moral saint’s task of 
promoting and benefitting others. 
According to Carbonell, in order to benefit others, a moral saint can make negative 
judgements. Carbonell claims that Wolf “is failing to recognize that making a negative 
                                                
17 I also discussed the question concerning the ignorance in chapter 1.1 The life of moral saints. 
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judgement when they are warranted is an essential component in the project of benefiting 
others” (2009a: 27). Carbonell’s (2009b: 384) point is that the considerations that are taken 
into account when acting out blind charity are not strictly speaking moral considerations. 
Instead, in many cases, blind charity may undermine the moral goals.18 This occurs 
specially when we think about blind charity in comparison with naiveté. According to 
Carbonell, these two can be indistinguishable in many cases. Naiveté is not a virtue. 
Carbonell’s second concern is related to the previous one. Carbonell (2009b: 386) claims 
that moral saints are logically self-defeating. Carbonell has in mind that “two or more 
necessary components of sainthood cannot consistently be instantiated in the same person” 
(ibid). The problem lies in the fact that moral saints should be sincere, but it is hardly ever 
the case that one can remain positive and charitable towards others at every instance, 
unless one admits to blind charity. If blind charity is not necessarily or should not be a part 
of a moral saint’s character – as claimed by Carbonell earlier – then Wolf’s moral saint has 
to be insincere, at least occasionally: “the moral saint cannot sincerely be considerate of 
illegitimate demands, unless she is completely unaware of their illegitimacy” (ibid: 387). 
Next, I will explain how, according to Carbonell and Adams, a moral saint’s life can be a 
well-rounded one. 
2.1.3 Well-­‐rounded	  life	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  moral	  point	  of	  view	  
Different understandings of a moral saint’s character lead us to the question about what 
it means to take up a moral point of view. In Wolf’s description, a moral saint’s life is not 
well-rounded. The fact that moral saints issue single-handedly from the moral point of 
view makes their life strangely barren and unattractive to us. Both Carbonell and Adams 
criticize Wolf for her approach. Carbonell questions Wolf’s understanding concerning the 
relation between the moral point of view and the point of view of individual perfection. 
According to Carbonell, “a moral saint is a person, not just a deliberative faculty” (2009b: 
396) – taking up a moral point of view does not make one ‘a robot’. As we saw previously, 
then, for Carbonell, a person whom we call a moral saint can accommodate different 
character traits and welcome different interests. Moral saints do not refrain from 
everything besides morality: they just take morality and morally important issues as their 
main concern. Carbonell understands Wolf’s point of view of individual perfection as “not 
exactly moral, not exactly egoistic” but certainly containing “elements of both of those 
                                                
18 For instance, when the person is acting charitably with another person whose bad character traits cannot be 
overlooked.  
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perspectives” (ibid: 375). If we present moral saints as persons and human beings, not as 
machines, then their life can be compatible with the point of view of individual perfection 
and be a well-rounded one. The latters also include morality. 
For Adams, on the other hand, there is an inconsistency between the Loving Saint and the 
moral point of view. Adams (1984: 394) claims that the Loving Saint fits perfectly into the 
framework of utilitarian moral theory without taking up the moral point of view described 
by Wolf.19 As Adams puts it while citing Wolf:  
A utilitarian (…) might argue that for many people a life not "dominated by a 
commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole" could 
perfectly express “recognition of the fact that one is just one person among others 
equally real and deserving of the good things of life”. (1984: 394–395) 
If, for utilitarians, acting morally means, first of all, the improvement of the welfare of 
others or of society as a whole, then a moral point of view might not be about recognizing 
one’s equal position among them: “dedication to the good of others is not the same as 
weighing their good equally with one's own” (Adams 1984: 395). Adams (ibid: 394) 
emphasizes the role of general utility in utilitarian thinking. The latter can also be 
purported by pursuing one’s own happiness and perfection. Thus, the Loving Saint must 
not take up the moral point of view described by Wolf in order to act morally worthy. 
In addition to Wolf’s moral point of view, Adams poses an interesting question concerning 
the limits of morality as an object for maximal devotion.20 Adams (1984: 399) makes a 
distinction between the ‘perfect obedience to the laws of morality’ and ‘the maximal 
devotion to the interests of morality’. He claims that Wolf’s arguments do not go against 
the former, but the latter: Adams questions Wolf’s understanding that maximal devotion 
can be understood in terms of passion.21 According to Adams, “maximal devotion is much 
more than passion” (ibid: 400). Maximal devotion can be understood in terms of religion, 
not in terms of morality: “Religion is richer than morality, because its divine object is so 
                                                
19 For Wolf’s moral point of view, see chapter 1.2.2 Moral vs. non-moral point of view. 
20 Adams starts her argument with questioning the limited nature of saint’s life. He issues from the 
understanding that “sainthood is essentially religious phenomenon” (1984: 398) and “saints are people in 
whom the holy or divine can be seen” (ibid). According to him, the interests of saints are dependent upon the 
interests of god, because “sainthood is a participation in God’s interests” (ibid). But Adams claims that god is 
far from being that limited as Wolf claims moral saints to be – god has time and attention for interests other 
than morality as well. In addition, “as the author of all things and of all human capacities” (ibid), god should 
also be “interested in many forms of human excellence” (ibid) – the latter for the sake of the excellences 
themselves, not merely for the sake of morality. 
21 See chapter 1.1.2 Cons about Wolf’s critique against morality as the object of desire. 
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rich” (ibid). A moral saint’s life can be a well-rounded one: Wolf’s description of a moral 
saint’s life does not take into account the limits of morality and moral devotion as such. 
Next I will turn to defend Wolf’s claims against Carbonell’s and Adams’ critique. 
2.2 In	  defence	  of	  Susan	  Wolf	  
In counterbalance to the critics, Wolf has proponents as well.22 Most of them try to 
further develop one aspect of Wolf’s ideas in “Moral Saints”. They hardly ever try to 
explicitly question the claims of the critics of Wolf. Rather, they just leave them out from 
the picture. In what follows, I will break the ‘tradition’ and answer to the critics of Wolf. 
This is relevant because Wolf’s characterization of moral saints is important for her other 
claims. If it can be shown that Wolf’s critics are mistaken or that their claims are at least 
questionable, then the ground for making further claims concerning morality and moral 
theories based on Wolf’s ideas is definitely more solid. First, I will turn to the 
characterization of moral saints as blindly charitable by Carbonell. Second, I will focus on 
the question about the essence of moral sainthood according to Carbonell and Adams. 
Finally, I will turn to the problem concerning different viewpoints and open the door to 
further questions concerning morality and moral theories that stand in the centre of the 
outcomes of this thesis. 
2.2.1 Charity	  and	  moral	  saints	  
Carbonell claims that Wolf’s moral saint is self-defeating due to the incompatibility in 
her virtuous character traits.23 Carbonell finds support from Driver’s analysis about virtues 
– such as blind charity – that necessarily include ignorance in order to be exercised. In 
Wolf’s description of the blindly charitable attitude of moral saints, ignorance should have 
its place. According to Carbonell, this would be incompatible with the moral sainthood as 
such. Still, there are some weak points in Carbonell’s argument. For starters, it is fair to 
question whether blind charity is a virtue after all, because “characterized essentially in 
terms of an epistemic defect of never seeing the bad in others, might well lead the blindly 
charitable person to support and sustain all sorts of bad habits in others” (Flanagan 1990: 
427). If blind charity is not a virtue, then it adds further doubts to the correctness of 
                                                
22 See e.g. Owen Flanagan’s “Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection” (1986) or Earl Connee’s 
“The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection” (1994). 
23 See chapter 2.1.2 Two mistakes in Wolf’s reasoning. 
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Carbonell’s understanding of Wolf’s moral saints. Again, Wolf does not seem to propose 
this kind of charity for moral saints. 
Furthermore, Carbonell presents the idea that moral saints should be charitable only when 
charity is called for. She claims that this weakens Wolf’s characterization of moral saints 
because this feature (a) would not make moral saints unattractive to us and (b) would 
contradict with Wolf’s understanding of moral saints as never allowing themselves to take 
a negative attitude towards others and the world. Still, both of Carbonell’s claims are 
questionable. Carbonell does not clarify what she means by being charitable when it is 
called for. If this merely means that one is not blindly charitable, then moral saints can still 
be unattractive to us – a moral saint can seem ‘too good’ for us without necessarily being 
naïve. A person who never acts solely according to her own interests, although remaining 
charitable only if charity is called for, can still be ‘too good’ as a real life character. A 
moral saint can be careful about bad people or situations where helping someone or 
something would definitely not produce any good, but this still leaves room for a zillion 
situations where a moral saint can show her charity. That might not be too many for moral 
saints, but probably is too many for us to handle.  
Also, remaining charitable only when charity is called for does not mean that one has to 
take a negative attitude towards others and the world. Being reasonable or realistic does 
not necessarily lead us to a negative attitude. Wolf does not claim moral saints to be 
charitable in the sense of being naïve. Wolf states that moral saints are ‘too good’ and the 
question is whether a moral saint’s goodness diminishes her own well-being from the 
perspective of the well-rounded life. Wolf (1982: 421) says that moral saints need to be 
‘reluctant to make negative judgements’ – important is the general disposition to be 
positive. Also, in the case of charity, one does not need to take ‘an attitude of resignation 
and pessimism’ towards others or the world. Rather, one needs to be able to reason one’s 
way through different situations in a moral way. This is compatible with being virtuous. 
Moreover, Kantians and utilitarians would demand this kind of behaviour from their moral 
saints. For Kantians, it is important that one understands, accepts, and follows the moral 
law. For utilitarians, one should be able to decide in favour of the situations that produce 
more happiness. Reasoning is needed in both cases. Next, I will turn to the question 
concerning the essence of moral sainthood. 
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2.2.2 The	  essence	  of	  (moral)	  sainthood	  
Wolf, Carbonell, and Adams seem to interpret the essence of moral sainthood in 
different ways. For Wolf, it is important that moral saints try to be ‘as morally good as 
possible’ – both, in their thoughts and deeds. Carbonell seems to emphasize the morality of 
actions over the one of thoughts. For Adams, the essence of sainthood is the goodness in a 
religious sense. In what follows, I will defend Wolf’s ideas against Carbonell and Adams. 
First, I will analyse the relationship between a saint’s inner disposition to be moral and her 
outer deeds. Next, I will turn to the question of goodness in the case of morality. 
It seems that, for Carbonell, the essence of moral sainthood lies in the way one acts. When 
talking about charity as a virtue, Carbonell emphasizes the role of a negative attitude that a 
moral saint can – and she seems to suggest that even should – take. If a moral saint sees 
someone acting wrongly, then, according to Carbonell, she must not refrain from the 
negative attitude that these kinds of actions evoke in her. The latter would make a moral 
saint insincere. In addition, there can be other reasons why a moral saint might not want to 
show off her attitude. For instance, Carbonell claims that a moral saint might have “moral 
reason not be angry at the person preaching hatred on the street corner,” if her “anger 
might provoke him to become violent against innocent bystanders” (2009b: 381). Thus, in 
certain situations, a moral saint might have “a reason not to display” her anger, “not a 
reason to refrain from feeling it” (2009b: 381). Moral saints can make negative judgements 
concerning others and the world without really deviating from their title. For Carbonell’s 
moral saint – Dr Farmer – the goodness and positivity of actions seems to be more 
important than the same in one’s feelings and thoughts. 
This is incompatible with moral saints described by Wolf. Although Wolf states that a 
moral saint is a person whose ‘every action is as morally worthy as can be’, she also 
emphasizes the absence of negative attitude toward others in moral saints. This indicates 
the important role of inner disposition concerning ones thoughts and feelings. As we saw at 
the end of the chapter 1.1 The life of moral saints, for Wolf, the distinctive feature that all 
moral saints share is that they are motivated to be ‘as morally good as possible’. According 
to Wolf, the Rational and the Loving Saint have different motivation to fulfil this essential 
feature, but being as morally good as possible is dominant ‘in the determination of their 
characters’. Moral thoughts as well as deeds are essential for Wolf’s moral saints. 
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Although Carbonell does not claim that moral thoughts are unimportant, she certainly 
emphasizes their role less than Wolf does. 
This conflict between the views of Wolf and Carbonell can be seen as a disagreement 
concerning what it takes to be moral: what is the essence of moral saints that makes them 
the ideals of moral theories? The question is related to the wider problem about what 
morality can demand from us – about the normative judgments and claims that morality 
can make. David Heyd (2011) distinguishes between two categories of normative 
judgments through which morality guides our behaviour. On the one hand, there are 
judgments related to phenomena that show the open-ended face of morality – goodness, 
ideals, and virtues. Heyd (ibid) sees virtuous character traits and ethical ideals as having no 
fixed measure. Thus, it should be possible to always improve and realize them further. In 
other words, there seems to be no certain limit how far can one go with morality – we can 
always aim at higher ideals.  
On the other hand, there are also moral judgments related to moral requirements – related 
to ‘what ought to be done’. In contrast to the open-ended aspects of morality, moral 
judgments as requirements have more or less clear criteria for fulfilment or violation (Heyd 
2011). If one follows a certain set of principles, then one can be assured the she has acted 
morally. The existence of the fixed set of principles that most of us have approved seems 
to refer that there is a general ability of moral agents to act according to these rules (ibid). 
This is what morality in general demands from us, but it does not seem to indicate that 
there has to be an inner disposition to be and to do morally good. This normativity of 
morality is mainly about human actions. 
Still, in the case of moral saints it seems that following the principles of moral theories also 
leaves room for maximizing the realization of these principles. If we recall Urmson’s 
claims concerning the limits of morality, then he stated that there are some things that 
should be morally mandatory for everyone and some that should belong to the sphere of 
sainthood.24 For Heyd, the latter is related to the open-ended part of morality. One 
possibility is to see the open-ended facet of morality making it possible for us to 
distinguish between saints and persons who are just ‘moral enough’. Otherwise – if we 
would settle merely with the demands of morality and with the display of human actions – 
we could say that moral saints are not extraordinarily moral, but simply persons who fulfil 
                                                
24 See chapter 1.1 The life of moral saints. 
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their moral obligations. Indeed, most – if not all – moral theories leave the borders of 
morality open for their affirmers. For utilitarians, it can be seen in the endless promotion of 
happiness, for Kantians25 in following the moral law and duties to the utmost degree. In the 
case of principle-based moral theories the problem seems to be thus again that they do not 
put down a limit to which the principles should be followed. The realization of the 
principles themselves can be seen as belonging to the open-ended part of morality. 
In relation to the open-ended part of morality, it is easier to understand why Wolf relies 
mainly upon the goodness as such in moral saints: it is something that differentiates moral 
saints from ‘normal’ moral agents. In contrast to Wolf, Carbonell refers more to moral 
saint’s important aim of benefitting others. Since a moral saint can benefit others mainly 
through her actions, Carbonell’s emphasis on the latters seems justified.26 Nevertheless, it 
seems that a moral saint’s moral actions are the outcome of them already being moral, not 
the essence of it. There must be something inside moral saints that precedes their actions 
even if the role of the moral actions is also essential. One can do outer moral deeds without 
deeper inner implications and we would usually praise it as good moral behaviour. Still, we 
would not consider a person who acts perfectly moral but does not have a moral mind-set 
to be a moral saint. We would probably think this person to be just moral enough. 
Compared to actions, Carbonell seems to give undeservedly little attention to other moral 
aspects of moral saints. 
Adams, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of goodness in the essence of saints.27 For 
him, the saint’s actions are of second importance. As he states that saints “are not in 
general even trying to make their every action as good as possible” (1984: 396). In Adams’ 
interpretation, saints “commonly have time for things that do not have to be done, because 
their vision is (…) of a divine goodness that is more than adequate to every need” (ibid). 
Since Adams is mainly talking about sainthood in a religious context, we cannot transfer 
his words directly to the context of moral theories. Yet, there are some interesting 
                                                
25 In the case of Kantians, it might be hard to understand that there is a sphere of open-ended part of morality. 
Also, there are philosophers who argue against the possibility of supererogation in Kantian ethics (see e.g. 
Marcia Baron’s article “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation”). But if we think about moral law, there 
certainly are different levels according to which one can obey it. We all should obey the moral law, but some 
of us are able to do it in more perfection than others. 
26 Saying that Carbonell does not turn attention to moral saint’s thoughts would be an obvious exaggeration – 
she does talk about the sincerity as an important virtue of moral saints, about the wish to help others as a 
crucial feature of them, etc. The problem occurs mainly when she criticizes Wolf’s characterization of moral 
saints. Then Carbonell’s emphasis is put on moral saint’s actions, not on her thoughts. 
27 See chapter 2.1.1 New versions of (moral) saints. 
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implications. Along with the traditional – i.e. religious – sainthood, moral sainthood also 
seems to imply some sort of special goodness with which the saint is related to or better 
intertwined with. Also Wolf claims that moral saints are ‘too good’ for us. But what kind 
of goodness are we talking about here? Adams is certainly talking about the goodness that 
derives from god. Moral theories talk about goodness as such but they do so without 
necessarily referring to god.28  
An interesting comparison can be drawn between seeing persons as saints or as blessed 
ones. William Desmond writes about a kind of blessedness that is ‘happiness and more’ – 
it is being “blessed with goodness and by the good, and perhaps the good things of life” 
(2001: 71). According to Desmond (ibid: 72) we are all already blessed with some 
goodness as we are seeking it: we could not search for the good if the good was not already 
at work in us. But there are also people who we see as specially blessed. As Desmond 
describes them: 
A different lights shines upon them, shines out of them, from the start. We notice this 
in special cases, and we say the person is blessed with, say a laughing temperament, or 
a good memory, or an amiable disposition: as much gift as achievement, a 
predisposition towards the good that already is a sharing in the good (…) The halo of 
the good shines around the person, because it is clear that something deeply good is at 
work in this person (…) This is a blessed condition. (2001: 71). 
This kind of being blessed seems similar to what Adams had in mind when talking about 
goodness in a religious sense. In real life it can be hard to differentiate a person who is 
being blessed by the goodness described by Desmond from a person who is a saint 
according to Adams and thus related to divine goodness.29 They both have ‘a different light 
shining upon them’, but they are still able to live a life that is well-rounded and full of 
different experiences. Neither being blessed nor being a saint seems to diminish the 
person’s appeal to us. But the case of Wolf’s moral saint is different because a moral saint 
can be blessed and believe in goodness, but she is also extremely devoted to morality. 
Moral saints incline towards maximizing the moral principles because there is no explicit 
                                                
28 Although the traditional reference to god as the (source of) goodness was still dominating until the 20th 
century and is also included in traditional moral theories. 
29 In a footnote, Desmond mentions that this kind of blessing should be seen as related to the “personalism” 
of the divine. This also refers that there is a relationship between sainthood – as a religious phenomena – and 
being blessed. 
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limit until how far the principles assigned according to moral theories should be 
followed.30 
There is an incompatibility between how Wolf, Carbonell, and Adams see the essence of 
sainthood. For Wolf, sainthood is about being as moral as possible: this includes both 
thoughts and deeds. Carbonell puts more emphasis on the importance of actions as she 
emphasizes the role of a moral saint’s actions in benefitting others. For Adams, the 
sainthood is about goodness. One can think about a saint’s goodness as being blessed with 
the good. If we look at Desmond’s description of blessedness, then moral saints certainly 
seem to be blessed with the good, but in addition, there is an indispensable desire and 
interest in morality. The latter is dominative: the essence of a moral sainthood is goodness 
understood in the context of morality. Adams’ standpoint talks against Carbonell here as 
well: Carbonell’s critique falls short when we point out the important part of the dimension 
of goodness or blessedness in moral saints. Carbonell describes moral saints more as 
regular people who are morally worthy. But if we think about moral theories and the open-
ended part of morality, then Carbonell’s description looks too moderate. Wolf’s 
description of moral saints is more in line with Adams’ understanding about the essence of 
sainthood. But since we are talking about moral saints, the dominating role of morality is 
added to the picture. Next, I will examine the relationship between morality and different 
viewpoints. 
2.2.3 Different	  points	  of	  view	  and	  morality	  
As we saw in chapter 1.2.2 Moral vs. non-moral point of view, there are different 
viewpoints from which one can have a look at life. The opinions about the same life can 
differ depending from the viewpoint. Also, moral saint’s attractiveness is dependent upon 
the latter. In “Moral Saints” Wolf introduces us to two points of view: one of morality and 
other of individual perfection. Just to review, for Wolf taking up the moral point of view is 
‘understanding that one is just one person among others’. The point of view of individual 
perfection is the point of view “from which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, 
and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be” (Wolf 1982: 
437). The latter viewpoint provides us “with reasons independent of moral reasons (and not 
                                                
30 Another interesting article “The Paradox of Moral Worth” (2004) is written by Kelly Sorensen and it gives 
another perspective to the problem. Sorensen analyses person’s desire to be morally praiseworthy and its 
unattractiveness to us. I will not study this here further because the moral saints of principle-based moral 
theories do not set as their aim to be morally praiseworthy. Rather, their aim is to live moral and they do that 
by following the principles. 
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reducible to self-interested reasons) for developing our characters and living our lives in 
some ways rather than the others” (Wolf 1999: 217).  
Carbonell and Adams do not agree with Wolf’s claims about the moral saint and different 
viewpoints.31 Carbonell argues that if we take into consideration her characterization of 
moral saints, then a moral saint’s point of view might not be that different from the point of 
view of individual perfection. Morality is also included in the latter. But the fact that 
morality or the moral point of view is also included in the point of view of individual 
perfection is not really a critique against Wolf’s claims.32 Wolf does not exclude the 
former from the latter, but claims that moral saints take up only the moral point of view. 
Wolf’s idea is that the point of view of individual perfection is broader than the moral 
point of view. When we assess our life, then we take into account morality as well as other 
aspects that play an important role in it. There are different kinds of reasons that we take 
into consideration and all of them are not moral ones. The strength of the point of view of 
individual perfection is exactly that it provides us with and also allows us to see the 
reasons that are independent from the moral ones. Thus, Carbonell’s claims do not really 
go against Wolf’s argument.  
Adams claims that a utilitarian moral saint must not take up the moral point of view 
described by Wolf, because it is not necessary in order to achieve the aim of the Loving 
Saint. The Loving Saint is the one who can maximize both utility and one’s own happiness 
at the same time: understanding one’s place among others might not be crucial for a 
utilitarian moral saint. Adams indicates that for utilitarians morality might not be 
essentially about others. The moral point of view is different for them: the Loving Saint 
can turn more attention to herself in order to reach her moral aim. There are other 
philosophers too who emphasize the role of oneself in our moral reasoning. This is often 
done with reference to the intrinsic worth of human beings. If one is to respect others for 
their intrinsic worth, one should also acknowledge the intrinsic worth of oneself. Patricia 
M. McGlodrick is one philosopher whose writings support Adams’ claims. As McGoldrick 
writes in her article “Saints and Heroes: A Plea for the Supererogatory” (1984):  
                                                
31 See chapter 2.1.3 Well-rounded life in accordance with moral point of view. 
32 Carbonell’s claims concerning the viewpoints are based upon of her arguments against Wolf’s 
characterization of moral saints. But we already saw in the chapters 2.2.1 Charity and moral saints and 2.2.2 
The essence of (moral) sainthood that the latter critique is questionable. 
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That morality involves something like recognizing and respecting the intrinsic worth 
or value of human beings is an idea implicit in most, if not all, ethical systems. But 
necessarily this entails recognizing and respecting the intrinsic worth of oneself. For if 
all human beings have intrinsic value, then so has each human being (…) we must also 
have respect for ourselves as beings with inherent worth. (1984: 526) 
However, the fact that morality is also about respecting ourselves does not exclude others 
from the picture. Respecting ourselves as human beings who have an intrinsic worth is 
compatible with recognizing one’s place among others. The main principle of 
utilitarianism is the principle of happiness. But in addition we should remember their 
general goal and ask what this happiness serves. We cannot overlook the social aspect of 
morality – in the case of utilitarians, happiness is still promoted for the general welfare of 
the society. One can promote one’s own happiness, but by doing that she is always 
connected to the others who live in the society. What matters is the general amount of 
happiness. If the Loving Saint would be benefitting just herself, then I doubt that the 
outcome would be greater than it would be in an opposite scenario – when she would try to 
benefit others. As we saw earlier, moral saints do reason and through this same reasoning, 
the Loving Saint understands that recognizing one’s place among others is important for 
the promotion of the general happiness in the society. One is having a moral deliberation, 
if one is looking at the situation “from a point of view that aggregates all the personal 
points of view into one” (Wolf 1999: 205). 
Another aspect that Adams questions is concerned with the scope of morality. He claims 
that morality cannot be an object of maximum devotion, because morality is not rich 
enough. According to Adams, in the case of saints, we cannot look at morality on par with 
religion – religion is something much more. In the light of Wolf’s writings, we can 
interpret this claim in two ways. On the one hand, we can understand Adams’ claim as 
initially directed against the main desire of Wolf’s moral saints. But in this case, Adams’ 
claims are not in sharp contrast with the ones of Wolf. Wolf sees sole devotion to morality 
weird and unhealthy – this is one feature of moral saints that we find unattractive. If we 
also look at Adams’ claim as questioning the reasonableness of a moral saint’s maximum 
devotion to morality, then Adams’ and Wolf’s thoughts are compatible.  
On the other hand, we can understand Adams’ claim as indicating the impossibility of 
moral saints. If morality cannot be the object of maximum devotion in a way that religion 
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can, then moral saints may remain solely the product of Wolf’s imagination without really 
questioning the ideals of moral theories. In this case, Adams’ claim questions Wolf’s 
whole project. Still, the claim that morality cannot be the object of maximal devotion is 
questionable. We can recall the open-ended part of morality described by Heyd.33 If there 
is a part of morality that has no limits, then why should there be a limit that restricts 
maximum devotion? Adams claims that religion is much richer than morality. He does not 
explain the basis of his claim, but if we interpret it in terms of goodness and the essence of 
sainthood, then we already saw that in the case of moral saints, goodness and morality are 
both integral parts of their character and life. Moral saints are the ideals of moral theories 
and maximum devotion to morality is compatible with the open-ended part of morality. 
Another question is whether maximum devotion to morality is something that we would 
approve: would we want to live a life dominated by morality? Wolf claims that we would 
not. Although she criticizes the life of moral saints, she does not claim that moral values 
are unimportant. Rather, for her the problem lies in the way moral theories usually 
understand the hierarchy of values, where moral values occupy the highest place. As Wolf 
writes:  
This is not to say that moral value should not be an important, even the most 
important, kind of value we attend to in evaluating and improving ourselves and our 
world. It is to say that our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a 
hierarchical system with morality at the top. (1982: 438) 
Wolf criticizes the moral theories that issue from one principle. According to these 
theories, one can live morally, when one is guided by the main principle. Wolf argues that 
these moral theories are mistaken: they adhere too strongly to the moral point of view and 
look at life only from this perspective. Carbonell’s and Adams’ critique seems to miss this 
point that Wolf makes. They do not pay attention to the character of moral saints as 
criticizing the status of main principles. The importance of the problems proposed by Wolf 
lies in big part in the way principle-based moral theories fail to draw a limit for following 
the principles and thus their conceptions of the good life may turn out to be too extreme.  
Wolf does not argue against the importance of morality in our lives, but she leaves 
unanswered what kind of role we should admit to the moral values in the good life as well 
as how should we understand the hierarchy of values. This leads us to the central questions 
                                                
33 See chapter 2.2.2 The essence of (moral) sainthood. 
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of this thesis: what is the role of morality and moral values in the concept of the good life 
when we keep in mind the character and life of moral saints? Are there still objective 
dimensions that should be taken into consideration when analysing different aspects of the 
good life? How can we understand the good way of living and how is it related to morality 
and moral theories? 
I propose there is a certain set of values, that is important for the good life, but there is not 
such a strict hierarchy as there is in the case of traditional moral theories. In the case of the 
latter, in life we should follow the central principle and maximize the highest values of the 
hierarchy. In the light of Wolf’s writings, there appear to be alternative ways of reaching 
the good life. One way is to see the good life – the maximum – that is looked for as a 
balance. In this balance, there is an objective dimension and moral values can still play the 
most important role, but in addition there are also other values that are important for the 
good life and also help to restrain the domination of moral ones. As we have learned from 
moral saints, the domination of morality and moral values in life is not the ideal we strive 
for.  
In this chapter I looked how Carbonell and Adams have criticized Wolf’s 
characterization of moral saints. First, I described Carbonell’s and Adams’ picture of moral 
saints. Carbonell claims that if moral saints were to be ‘as morally worthy as can be’, then 
they could not practice perfect moral agency, because their actions would include 
ignorance at least to some degree. On the other hand, if some of the traits – such as being 
charitable to an extreme degree – were not admitted to moral saints, then Wolf’s claim that 
moral saints are unattractive to us, might not hold. In addition, both Carbonell and Adams 
claim that moral saint’s life can be well-rounded despite of the fact that they issue from the 
moral point of view. Carbonell emphasizes the fact that a moral saint is still a person: 
although a moral saint takes morality to be her concern, she remains interested in other 
things as well. Adams claims that, for a utilitarian moral saint, the moral point of view is 
different from the one proposed by Wolf. Furthermore, he denies the possibility of 
morality being an object of maximal devotion. According to Adams, we can talk about 
perfect obedience to moral laws, but not about maximal devotion to morality. 
Second, I defended Wolf against her critics. I showed that Carbonell’s critique is 
questionable concerning the blind charity. Blind charity might not be a virtue in the first 
place. Wolf’s moral saint can be charitable only when it is called for – what Carbonell 
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seems to suggest as an appropriate way of charity – and still remain unattractive to us. 
Carbonell’s critique does not really go against Wolf’s claims. In addition, I examined the 
essence of moral sainthood described by Wolf, Carbonell, and Adams. I showed that the 
main aspect of moral sainthood is the intertwining of goodness and morality in moral 
saints. Last, I explained that Wolf’s understanding concerning the moral point of view 
holds. I proposed that the good life might consist of finding a balance between the different 
aspects of life instead of maximizing morality. In this balance moral values can still be the 
most important ones, but they are not dominating single-handedly – there is no sole aspect 
that should be maximized in the search of the good life. Next, I will turn to the testing of 
my proposals. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                              Ross, Good life 
 
 
50 
3. The way to the good life: in search of balance 
Wolf urges us to think about the role of morality and moral values in the good life and 
her claims concerning the unattractiveness of the ideals of moral theories are to the point. 
Still, there are questions that Wolf hesitates to give a clear-cut answer to. Among others 
are the questions concerning the role of moral values in the good life, the deeper 
explanation of the objective dimension of the point of view that one takes in order to 
evaluate life, and the clarification of what the good life consists of if it should not be 
concerned solely with morality. In this final chapter of my thesis I propose possible 
answers to these questions. Also, I will provide explanations why these answers comply 
with the good life given the way we usually understand it. In addition, I will point out how 
these answers go well together with Wolf’s ideas presented in her “Moral saints” as well as 
in her later works. 
First, I will open the question concerning the objective dimension of the good life with the 
help of Robert Nozick’s experience machine. Further, I will examine the role of moral 
values in the good life. I will look for the answers to some of the questions that Wolf 
leaves open. While taking into account Wolf’s ideas on the good life, I will examine 
whether the concept of the good life can be seen in relativistic or pluralistic manner. 
Second, I will explain how the maximum that we are looking for in the good life can be 
seen as a balance between different aspects – moral as well as non-moral ones – of our life. 
I believe that my proposal also provides moral theorizing with a better and more down-to-
earth standing in today’s world.  
3.1 The	  good	  life	  and	  its	  objective	  dimension	  
Wolf refers to non-subjective values that are in play when evaluating the 
meaningfulness and fulfilment of lives. She is against subjectivism – the view that moral 
judgments are “merely expressions of deeply held but unfounded emotional attitudes, the 
results of human psychology and social conditioning” (Wolf 1992: 786). But she does not 
explain what these non-subjective values that she is talking about are – according to Wolf, 
“finding an adequate account of the objective values – that is, of the ways or respects in 
which value judgments are not radically subjective – is an unsolved problem in 
philosophy” (2010: 47). It seems that the concept of the good life stemming from Wolf’s 
writings can be interpreted in the light of relativism as well as in the light of pluralism. In 
what follows, I will first explain the experience machine – a thought experiment 
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constructed by Robert Nozick. Next, I will examine the good life in the spirit of relativism 
and see whether Wolf’s ideas fit with this approach. Further, I will look at the good life 
from the pluralistic perspective and provide a Wolfian answers to the questions whether we 
would want to be plugged into the machine proposed by Nozick and if not, then why. 
3.1.1 The	  good	  life	  and	  the	  experience	  machine	  
Robert Nozick’s (1974) experience machine is a famous thought experiment that is 
related to the question concerning the subjective dimension of the good life.34 Nozick 
describes the thought experiment as follows: 
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you 
desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would 
think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an 
interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached 
to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life 
experiences? (...) Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll 
think that it's all actually happening. Others can also plug in to have the experiences 
they want, so there`s no need to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such 
as who will service the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? (1974: 
42–43) 
In short, the experience machine can produce all sorts of pleasant, interesting, thrilling, etc. 
experiences and these experiences seem as authentic as real life ones. Thus, the quality of 
the experiences does not diminish because of the machine. These experiences can be the 
best ones we could ever undergo, if this were our wish and if the machine were 
programmed accordingly. The question is whether we would want to be plugged in for life 
or not. Nozick’s (1974: 43) answer is that we would not. In general, Nozick emphasizes the 
role of directness, genuineness of the experiences that we like to have in our lives or that 
we want our lives to consist of.35  
If we try to answer the question in Wolf’s spirit, then our answer might be a bit different. 
Although it would also be negative, there may be other reasons for not plugging into the 
machine. Besides emphasizing the role of directness to and connection with the actual 
                                                
34 Although its main aim is questioning hedonism, especially the hedonistic claim that the only things that 
matter are our pleasurable experiences, it also suits to the given context. The point is that if we really thought 
that pleasure were the only good, then we would happily accept the proposal to plug into the machine. Still, 
at least some or most (if not all) of us would not be so eager to do that. In general, the argument can be seen 
as an argument against any theory of value that puts weight only to the subjective experiences, and in case of 
hedonism, it is to experiences of pleasure. 
35 Nozick claims that (1) “we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them”, (2) 
“we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person”, (3) “plugging into an experience machine limits 
us to a man-made reality (...) There is no actual contact with any deeper reality” (1974: 43). 
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world, we would also pay attention to the category of meaningfulness.36 As we already 
saw, meaningfulness is not solely about subjective pleasurable experiences, but about 
‘active engagement in projects of worth’. But can the experiences that are not genuine – 
not related to the ‘real world’ – fulfil the conditions that make the project worthwhile and 
thus also make life meaningful? It seems that the experiences created by the experience 
machine would not satisfy this condition. Next, I will study further why the experience 
machine would not suffice for the good life by looking at moral relativism and pluralism. 
3.1.2 The	  good	  life	  and	  moral	  relativism	  
Moral relativism is often referred to when talking about moral disagreements.37 
Relativism is seen in opposition with absolutism. In short, it can be understood as a view 
that sees morality as relative to some group of people. There is no absolute truth in moral 
judgments (Gowans 2008); moral codes are relative to a society (Wolf 1992: 786). The 
claim that moral judgments do not present absolute truth can be seen as a metaethical 
claim. It implies that there are no absolute moral truths. The second claim that morality is 
relative to some group of people is an empirical claim. It describes the way things are in 
the world: when we look at the way world is, we see that in practice there are different 
moral norms in different societies and we cannot say that some of them are true and others 
are false.  
Relativistic views are often compatible with sociological approaches to morality. In 
general it can be said that the sociological view on morality is based upon the fact that 
human beings are social beings and are thus constantly influenced by others: individuals 
feel and share a certain attitude of the group to which they belong. Morality is bound by 
the way people organize the world in a common way: it is not reducible to individual level. 
As George Herbert Mead (1972: 253) explains this idea using the example of an audience 
under the great speaker already at the minimal level of the development of the society: 
“One is influenced by the attitude of those about him, which are reflected back into the 
                                                
36 See chapter 1.3.2 Meaningfulness and fulfilment. 
37 Nowadays, relativism is often used as a negative term, because it roughly implies that different cultures 
and societies should just keep to themselves and not interfere in matters that are specific to a certain society. 
This also means that e.g. western people should not judge cannibalism if it takes place in other societies. 
Still, although few, there are philosophers who declare themselves to be relativists. See for instance David B. 
Wong’s book Natural Moralities: A Defence of Pluralistic Relativism (2006). Also, moral relativism often 
implies tolerance towards other moral systems. Wong talks about the relation between relativism and 
tolerance in „Moral Relativity and Tolerance“ (1984). 
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different members of the audience so that they come to respond as a whole. One feels the 
general attitude of the whole audience.” 38 
An interesting parallel can be drawn between Wolf’s views on meaningfulness and Axel 
Honneth’s theory concerning self-realization. Honneth’s approach to morality is more 
compatible with Mead’s approach and more different from classical ethical theories. In the 
case of classical ethical theories, moral norms are explicitly reflected upon in order to 
influence the conduct of individuals. Honneth also understands morality as being 
normative, but without reflecting upon certain claims that are e.g. derived from the main 
principle. Rather, morality is normative with the reference to the implicit barriers that 
people feel when living in a certain community. It means that there is a certain synergy that 
is felt by the group members and that assigns the normative rules for the conduct. 
Honneth emphasizes the role of self-realization in the good life. According to Honneth 
(1995: 172), one important precondition for the good life is meeting the conditions for self-
realization. In the ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Honneth’ s book The Struggle for 
Recognition, Joel Anderson claims that the conditions of self-realization in Honneth’s 
theory can be seen as “the establishment of relations of mutual recognition” (1995: x). The 
self-realization can be understood as individuals becoming autonomous. But the autonomy 
that Honneth has in mind is socially embedded – it does not issue from a single individual. 
The self-realization, autonomy, full human flourishing depends upon ‘ethical relations’ 
such as love, rights, and solidarity. These three form an inter-subjective protection of the 
good life.39  
                                                
38 This is similar to cognitive sociologists’ analysis about our cognition. They look at social perspective and 
analyse human beings first of all as social beings. For instance, according to Eviatar Zerubavel (1997: 6) we 
are the “products of particular social environments that affect as well as constrain the way we cognitively 
interact with the world” as social beings. Cognitive sociologists neglect the strictly individualistic 
understanding of our thinking. They claim that “what goes on inside our head is also affected by the 
particular thought communities to which we happen to belong” (ibid: 9). Inter-subjective world categorizes 
things according to the standard: “it is a world where the conventional categories into which we force 
different “types” of books, films, and music are based on neither our own personal sensations nor any 
objective logical necessity” (ibid: 10). 
39 What unites these relations is that they share ‘the same mechanism of reciprocal recognition’. Honneth 
understands love relationships as “constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of 
people.” (1995: 95) Legal relationships are experienced, when “one is able to view oneself as a person who 
shares with all other members of one’s community the qualities that make participation in discursive will-
formation possible.” (ibid: 120) Relations of solidarity refer to a need of human beings for “a form of social 
esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities.” (ibid: 121) 
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Self-realization is at the same time individual and inter-individual: it is about a single 
individual who becomes autonomous and realizes herself, but the individual is related to 
other individuals and realizes herself according to these relations. If we think about it in 
terms of meaningfulness, then one can understand the conditions that need to be satisfied 
for self-realization similar to the conditions that need to be satisfied for the ‘appropriate’ 
meaning. There needs to be a mutual recognition: in the case of self-realization, one needs 
to be involved in different relations; in the case of meaning in life, the object of love and 
fulfillment should also be recognized by others as the object of worth. There is an 
individual and an inter-individual aspect in the kind of self-realization described by 
Honneth and in the kind of meaningfulness described by Wolf.  
According to Honneth, self-realization is important for the good life. For Honneth the good 
life is an ethical life, but that does not mean that the good life is a strictly moral life. 
Honneth understands morality as “the point of view of universal respect” that is concerned 
with “the structural elements of ethical life” (1995: 172). In this case, morality “becomes 
one of several protective measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life” 
(ibid). Ethical life presupposes a common value-horizon among individuals. As Honneth 
claims: “For self and other can mutually esteem each other as individualized persons only 
on the condition that they share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to 
each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other.” (ibid: 
121)  
The value-horizon consists of an array of life-goals. According to Honneth societal goals 
can be determined “in terms of a seemingly neutral idea of ‘achievement’ or in terms of an 
open horizon of plural values” (1995: 126). In either way, further determination is needed 
because modern societies provide little guidance in measuring multiple goals. According to 
Honneth, cultural interpretation plays an important role. Thus, “in modern societies, 
relations of social esteem are subject to a permanent struggle, in which different groups 
attempt, by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, to raise the value 
of the abilities associated with their way of life.” (ibid: 127) Although there is a variety of 
life-goals, Honneth sees the need for “defining an abstract horizon of ethical values that 
would be open to the widest variety of life-goals” (1995: 179).40  
                                                
40 In The Struggle for Recognition Honneth does not explicitly determine the value-horizon, but in his later 
writings he examines the relation between power and the determination of value-horizon. Also he brings the 
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Honneth brings in an interesting new point of view that is important for the good life – the 
point of view of universal respect. For Honneth morality is an important aspect of the good 
life, but it does not single-handedly determine the life’s goodness. Individuals can have 
different life-goals and according to their life-goals they also consider certain aspects of 
life more valuable than others. This is surprisingly similar to the combination of the point 
of view of individual perfection and the external point of view described by Wolf. If we 
combine these two, then the good life is individual in a sense that there is no single way to 
it – it can consist of diverse aspects. But we also have the need for some external proof – 
we consider our lives good when we see them good from some point of view other than 
our own. 
For Honneth, in the point of view of mutual respect the common value-horizon that 
individuals share – the cluster of shared values – is important. People can have diverse life-
goals, but they share some core values that are more or less compatible with general life-
goals. Similarly, Wolf assumes that there is a non-subjective dimension in the good life – 
that is, in life that has meaning and fulfilment. The way we understand what projects and 
objects are worth pursuing is inter-subjective. But for Honneth the point of view of 
universal respect is the point of view of morality itself. For Wolf the point of view of 
individual perfection contains morality, but is not limited to it. It seems that for Wolf, the 
good life and morality are not merely relative to society, but there is also some deeper 
objective dimension to them. 
Still, it can be argued that different categories – meaningfulness and fulfilment – that Wolf 
brings into her discussion of the good life can be filled with different content. In case of 
moral disagreements, there are common categories – for instance, different societies have 
such a category as moral values – but the problem is that they fill in these categories with 
different content. In the case of meaningfulness, diverse societies can accept that 
meaningfulness is an important aspect of the good life, but if they see the opposite projects 
as being able to provide a meaning to life – if they see different things as valuable – then 
their understandings over the essence of a good life are relative to the societies. 
In Wolf’s approach to the good life, there are things that seem generally compatible with 
relativism. First of all, she questions the absoluteness of moral values. Secondly, Wolf 
                                                                                                                                              
conception of good closer to autonomy. See e.g. “Recognition and Ideology” (2009) by Honneth and the 
introduction to Recognition and Power (2007) by Bert van den Brink and David Owen. 
                                                                                                              Ross, Good life 
 
 
56 
states that in principle “almost anything that a significant number of people have taken to 
be valuable over a long span of time is valuable” (ibid). She claims that things can be 
valuable because a group of people believes them to be so. This claim can be interpreted as 
if according to Wolf there were no certain truths that one can take for granted and that can 
lead one to the good life. Finally, it is unclear, who are the ‘we’ that Wolf is talking about: 
is it the people who are a part of the western culture, the people who cannot stand moral 
saints, the people who theorize about morality and moral values, or people who share some 
other feature? There are several lives that can be good ones and the good life can contain 
values that are relative to a certain group. 
However, Wolf clearly does not want to end up in relativism. She never says that morality 
or moral values are relative from person to person or society to society. Wolf argues 
against one single conception of the good life and against the dominating role of morality, 
but not against absolute morality and objective moral values as such.41 Wolf’s approach to 
the good life can be defended against relativistic claims stated in the previous paragraph. 
First, the fact that Wolf argues against principle-based moral theories and the absoluteness 
of moral values does not mean that she argues for relativism. There are also other 
alternative approaches that one can have to morality and the good life. When Wolf refers to 
things that are valuable because some group of people have thought so at some point of 
time, then it seems that she is talking about different things in life that can provide 
meaning and are thus valuable to us. We can say that writing philosophical essays about 
morality provides a person with a meaning in life because these kind of philosophical 
essays are valued by a certain group of people and thus the person feels that her project is 
worthwhile. This does not necessarily mean that the good life is relative: there can still be 
an objective dimension in it.  
Also, one can see a difference between ‘something’s being a value and something’s being 
valued’ (Kekes 1993: 38; Kekes 1995: 19). In the case of the former, the connection with 
the benefits and harms is essential (Kekes 1995: 19). Wolf’s claim seems to refer to this. 
We can interpret it in terms that there are values that are objective, but the things that 
                                                
41 Similarly, Alasdaire MacIntyre (2000: 213) has argued that there are different values in different traditions. 
The societies and groups of people can be mistaken and they have to take into consideration that they might 
fall into epistemological crisis at some point. Still, the fact that traditions can be mistaken and in this process 
learn from each other does not mean that morality is relative. Instead, it shows that there are some standards 
that are not merely relative to the tradition itself. There are some standards that can vindicate moral systems 
in the cultures that have been mistaken.  
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provide us with the meaning are not values in the strict sense. They are things that are 
being valued by somebody. Thus, there are things that are values in strict sense and things 
that are valuable and related to the individual meaning in life.42 Finally, there is a question 
concerning the ‘we’ that Wolf is referring to. I believe that this ‘we’ should not be over-
emphasized. I take it as referring to people who are used to living according to the so-
called everyday morality. It does not mean that morality is relative to groups of people. 
Rather, it means that the way we understand the good life is not in accordance with the 
ones who understand the good life as a strictly moral one. 
Although at first glance, the way the good life is considered in this thesis might look 
compatible with relativism, it would be arbitrary to interpret it as being completely relative 
to a specific environment, culture, or society that we belong to. The fact alone that Wolf 
points out different aspects and viewpoints according to which we evaluate lives, 
recognizes that there are some categories in life that are important and stand above the 
relative conditions. One example of these categories is the meaningfulness understood in 
combination with fulfilment. If we think about Wolf’s description of moral saints, about 
the point of view of individual perfection, about the meaning in life, and about the feeling 
of fulfilment, she tries to show that there is no one way to reach the good life. The good 
life is something that consists of different aspects – it is a combination of different 
interests, values, desires, reasons, and viewpoints. People can live different lives and all of 
them can be good ones. There are no absolute principles or absolute values that can help us 
on our way. But while arguing for these claims, Wolf never questions the objective 
dimension of morality and the good life. Next, I will turn to the question whether this 
objective dimension can be found in the pluralistic approach to morality. 
3.1.3 The	  good	  life	  and	  moral	  pluralism	  
For Wolf, how we exactly understand and live a good life can be relative to a person, 
but she does not claim the same for morality. In a good life, there is an objective dimension 
that we take into consideration. Wolf supports some kind of objectivism, but what kind of 
objectivism are we talking about here? The opposition between relativism and absolutism 
did not get us any further in interpreting Wolf’s thoughts. Maybe looking at the opposition 
                                                
42 Kekes has in mind that we can make mistakes in our valuing: there are so called ‘real values’ and things 
that are being valued. This can also be compatible with Wolf’s writing.  
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of moral pluralism and monism is more fruitful.43 Moral pluralism can be defined in 
different ways. The most common is to understand moral pluralism in terms of values: it is 
a view according to which diverse values are not reducible to a single one.44 Besides 
values, it can also refer to principles. In her “Two Levels of Pluralism”, Wolf describes 
pluralism as follows:  
Pluralism in ethics (…) is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or 
principles that are relevant to moral judgment (…) the plurality of morally significant 
values is not subject to a complete rational ordering (…) no principle or decision 
procedure exists that can guarantee a unique and determinate answer to every moral 
question involving a choice among different fundamental moral values or principles. 
(1992: 785). 
In short, according to pluralists, there can be multiple values and principles that are not 
reducible to a single one. In the context of the good life this leads us to the understanding 
that human lives can be good in various ways: there is not one single rule that has to be 
followed in order to live well.  
Although Wolf does not explicitly claim that she is a pluralist she seems to be so inclined. 
We can see it in the way she balances between the claims that there are multiple values and 
there is no one way to the good life, on the one hand, and the claims that there is some sort 
of objective dimension in the way we evaluate lives, on the other. She does not give 
explicitly her voice to pluralism, but certainly does not argue against it either. As Wolf 
ends her “Two Levels of Pluralism”:  
Pluralism is offered, not as a challenge to absolutism, but as an option for those of us 
who find ourselves for other reasons unable to unwilling to be absolutists. Pluralism 
offers an answer to the question of how a commitment to objectivity in ethics can be 
reconciled with pervasive and persistent disagreements, given the very significant 
possibility that rational reflection and empirical fact may never be sufficient to resolve 
them. (1992: 798) 
In addition, in Freedom Within Reason (1990) Wolf argues for the view of normative 
pluralism: “the view that although Reason constrains values it does not constrain them 
                                                
43 This is not the only way to understand these oppositions. For instance, Wolf contrasts pluralism with 
absolutism. 
44 See e.g. Elion Mason’s compendious article “Value Pluralism” (2011) in Stanfod Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
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completely, and that therefore there may be two or more normative positions that are 
equally and maximally supported by Reason” (1990: 135). Normative pluralism supports 
the objectivity of values, but according to this view “values and value judgments are 
partially objective” (ibid, emphasize added). 
Wolf argues that if we have to choose between different actions, there is no certain answer 
to the question what kind of action we should perform. Indeed, it is often the case that in 
situations with multiple choices there are no clear-cut solutions: different reasons that we 
take into consideration do not provide us with the answer, they just limit the choice. As 
also Douglas W. Portmore argues “the relevant reasons do not require performing some 
particular act, but instead permit performing any of numerous act alternatives” (2012: 24). 
According to Wolf:  
The fact that Reason cannot choose between two particular actions or policies, or even 
two particular systems of value or normative theories, does not imply (…) that Reason 
does not constrain the options among which it fails to choose (…) it may point to the 
fact that the truth about values, even in conjunction with, say, the truth about human 
psychology and concrete circumstances, is merely insufficient to determine a single 
specifiable way of life. (1990: 135) 
Wolf emphasizes that although the debate over the objectivity of the values usually goes 
about moral values, she is also interested in other kind of values: “there may be a plurality, 
not only of good moral outlooks, but also of good aesthetic values and of good personal 
ideals” (1990: 137).  
Being inclined towards pluralism does not mean that there cannot be any universal or 
objective claims concerning the good life. Pluralism does not exclude objectivity. 
Important is the personal satisfaction as well as the moral merit – these two are linked with 
each other in a good life (Kekes 1993: 161). Moral merit is not merely relative. As we have 
seen, Wolf believes in some objective standards that we are looking for and that we take 
into consideration in search of the good life. Wolf admits that there is an objective 
dimension in the good life. As we saw in chapter 1.3.2 Meaningfulness and fulfilment, 
there are projects that are not suitable for the meaningfulness in life. There are things that 
we find valuable and things that we do not. We want to see that the projects that we are 
engaged in, the way we are, and the way we live is valuable from some other point of view 
besides our own.  
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Wolf does not argue against the objectivity of the values. She just leaves open the exact 
nature of this objective dimension because she claims that no exhaustive explanation has 
been provided yet. Wolf (2010: 46) is reluctant to agree with philosophers who argue for 
the inter-individual account of values as well as with the ones who refer to the hypothetical 
responses of idealized individuals or groups. Against the former, Wolf claims that “the 
history of art, or for that matter of morals, seems ample testimony to the view that whole 
societies can be wrong” (ibid). Concerning the second view, Wolf (ibid) cannot see why 
the value of an object should depend upon an imaginary individual rather than upon us – 
the people who actually value the object. One possibility is to see this objective dimension 
in humanness as such.45  
Aristotelians emphasize the importance of the objective dimension among human beings 
and their lives. In “Moral Saints”, Wolf mentions that her “remarks may be taken to 
support more Aristotelian (…) approach to moral philosophy” (1982: 433). Let us see next 
whether these two approaches coincide with one another. Martha Nussbaum is one of the 
Aristotelians who argues for the shared features of human beings. Nussbaum (2000: 170–
171) points to the care with which Aristotle described the spheres of experience of human 
beings that virtues correspond to.46 If one is living a human life, then one’s experiences fall 
into these spheres: one cannot escape them “no matter where one lives (…) so long as one 
is living a human life” (ibid: 171). For instance, when we think about the sphere of fear – 
and especially about the fear of important damages such as death – then everybody has 
‘some attitude and corresponding behaviour’, towards her own death. One can ask what 
kind of attitude and behaviour is considered to be appropriate, but the sphere itself is the 
same. 
Nussbaum examines human life and brings out the spheres that we can find in human life 
in general – regardless of the specific culture.47 Nussbaum (2000: 176–177) lists among 
others mortality, body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, practical reason, and 
humour. Based upon these spheres, she claims that there is an objective dimension 
according to which we can compare and evaluate different lives and different moral 
                                                
45 Wolf (1990: 135) mentions ‘the truth about human psychology’. She obviously refers to the shared features 
of human beings. 
46 In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle brings out spheres like fear, pleasure and pain, getting and spending, 
honour and dishonour, anger, self-expression, conversation, social conduct, shame, indignation.  
47 Nussbaum says Aristotle’s approach to be the role model of her list. 
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systems. Nussbaum agrees with the critique that there is no pure access to human nature as 
such. But she claims that there is human life as it is lived and in this human life “we do 
find a family of experiences, clustering around certain focuses, which can provide 
reasonable starting points for cross-cultural reflection” (ibid: 177). 
In this light, Nussbaum’s standpoint looks compatible with Wolf’s views. Nussbaum’s 
theory about the shared experiences can help us provide an answer to the question why 
some lives are better and why some projects are more worthwhile than the others. It is that 
some lives are more compatible with the common features of humanness and some 
projects help promote these features more than others. Aristotelians provide an objective 
dimension to the evaluation that Wolf has been looking for. Still, there is an 
incompatibility between Wolf and Aristotelians. Namely, according to Aristotelians, 
because of the shared aspects of human nature – the ‘features of humanness’ – there should 
also be one single account of human good. For Aristotle, the human good consisted of 
virtuous activities. As Kraut (2014) has put it, living well for Aristotle consists in ‘lifelong 
activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul’. For Wolf, on the other 
hand, there is no single account of human good, but several, and this is likely why Wolf 
ultimately refrained from approving Aristotelian virtue ethics. There are things that we 
exclude from the good life, but there is not a sole solution for finding it. Human good as 
such cannot be determined in an absolute way.  
There are also other philosophers who believe in a plurality of values and add an objective 
dimension to the picture. John Kekes is one of the most famous contemporary pluralist 
who states that there are certain features that are peculiar to human beings. Kekes (1991: 
28) points out three kinds of facts that represent universal human characteristics: the facts 
of the body, the facts of the self, and the facts of social life. With the facts of the body, 
Kekes has in mind human characteristics that are physiological – that “determine the 
structure and function of the human body” (ibid). The facts of the self are psychological 
characteristics. These include having “capacities to learn from the past and plan for the 
future”, “view of our talents and weaknesses”, and “attitudes (…) toward our family, 
illness, death, toward the young and the old, success and failure” (ibid). The facts of social 
life are concerned with the aspects of our lives that force cooperation – e.g. vulnerability, 
scarce resources, bringing up a child, limited strength, intelligence, and energy. These 
require “social organization that, in turn, depends on the adjudication of conflicts, handing 
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down customs, respect for authority,” etc. (ibid). These three types of human 
characteristics “establish what must be the minimum conditions for human welfare” (ibid). 
As a pluralist, Kekes claims that “human lives can be good in many different ways” (1991: 
147), but at the same time there are universal claims based on the facts of the body, the 
self, and social life that are ‘equally binding on all moral agents’ (ibid). These universal 
claims are not sufficient for the good life, but are the minimum human needs that must be 
met. We should think about them as conditions that satisfy the basic needs of human 
beings – these needs “are the same for all human beings at all times and all places and 
under all conditions” (Kekes 2008: 95–96). The good life also includes other things, but 
these can vary from individual to individual or from society to society. The plurality of 
values, principles, and goods allows this kind of variation without diminishing the 
importance of universal claims.  
The connection between Kekes’ approach to objectivity and Wolf’s ideas concerning the 
good life might not be that clear at first glance. How can the determination of basic facts 
about human beings lead us closer to deciding what life is a good one? As we saw in 
chapter 3.1.1 Meaningfulness and fulfilment, there are some projects that are more suitable 
for creating the meaning in life and some that are less. Similarly, when we think about the 
good life, there are some lives that we consider to be better than others. The objectivity that 
Kekes offers is about the basic needs and thus not refined enough to suit for the latter 
purposes.  
Nevertheless, we should remember that determining the good life is not really Wolf’s 
purpose. There is no single way to a good life, because there is no single good life.48 There 
is a plurality of values – some of them more and some of them less individual. Among 
others, there are values that are objective and valid for all. Still multiple lives that 
accommodate a plurality of values can be good ones. The sphere of ethics can be 
understood wider than morality in terms of the good life: if we think about ethics in terms 
                                                
48 Also Kekes (2000: 98) argues that meaning in life cannot be found when looking for a general answer. 
There are individual differences and these differences are not merely variations, but meaning in life derives 
from different sources. 
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of how to live well, it may not be merely about morality and moral values.49 As Wolf 
claims:  
[a]ppreciation of the Good need not be confined to appreciation of the moral Good. 
Indeed, in certain contexts, appreciation of the moral good may interfere with one’s 
ability to appreciate the non-moral good or with one’s ability to recognize reasons for 
preferring a morally inferior course of action. (1990: 137) 
It seems that Kekes’ pluralistic view on morality and his understanding that there are 
things common to all human beings, are indeed compatible with Wolf’s ideas concerning 
the good life. Kekes examines human beings according to our physical, psychological, and 
social features and points at the objective dimension that we all share. With reference to 
these features, Kekes claims that there are objectives that need to be fulfilled for the 
minimum welfare of human beings. There is a plurality of values and they have an 
objective dimension due to our common human needs. 
According to Wolf, there seem to be some values that are more basic – we want to see 
these values as objective. Kekes offers us a possibility to see these values as stemming 
from the shared essence of human beings and human life. Kekes (1993: 18–19) names 
these values primary ones: they are resulting from the basic needs of human being and 
related to benefits and harms that are universally human. Since there are physiological, 
psychological, and social facts, there is also plurality among primary values. In addition, 
there are also secondary values. The secondary values reflect the differences among 
individuals, societies, traditions, and historical periods. These values depend upon the life 
that we are living. There are different kinds of lives and in different lives different things 
can be rightly valued. After all, our basic needs can be satisfied in different forms and 
ways – e.g. we need to eat, but there can be a variance in what, where, and how we eat. 
The way we see the good life can vary from individual to individual and from society to 
society. 
We can combine Wolf’s conception of the good life with Kekes’ understanding of the 
plurality of values. We can understand the primary values as providing an objective 
dimension to Wolf’s conception of the good life. The primary values are naturally 
occurring values and can be seen as the most important ones. We can think about primary 
                                                
49 In this light we can also draw a connection between Honneth’s and Wolf’s views. For Honneth, morality is 
one part of the ethical – the good – life. For Wolf, there are multiple aspects that constitute a good life – some 
of them are moral ones, but not all. 
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values as being the closest to the moral sphere of our lives. Kekes (1993: 19) also 
exemplifies the distinction between primary and secondary values with the distinction of 
moral and non-moral ones. Indeed, when we think about the features that all human beings 
share, then by large moral values seem to fall under one of the three facts that Kekes points 
out. Also, when we think about Wolf’s understanding of the moral point of view50, then it 
seems that the values upheld when taking up the moral viewpoint are compatible with 
Kekes’ description of primary values. Primary values can be seen as a core of what it takes 
to live a human life and upholding them implies that we see ourselves just as humans 
among other humans.  
We saw earlier that Wolf does not use the term ‘moral values’ when describing pluralism, 
but refers to ‘morally significant values’. This change of terminology looks like a good 
idea. Primary values described by Kekes are related to moral sphere, but to call these 
values strictly moral values is a bit sudden. Especially when we think about the primary 
values in terms of basic needs that humans have. The values that are related to basic human 
needs are certainly morally significant ones, but drawing a direct line between e.g. the need 
to eat and a moral value seems some how too sharp. The morally significant values can be 
seen as the most important ones. Morality plays an important role in Wolf’s concept of the 
good life, but besides moral reasons and values, there are other reasons and values that are 
important for us as well 
Wolf’s conception of the good life is compatible with pluralism also when we think about 
meaningfulness and well-roundedness. There is an objective dimension in her 
understanding of the good life and the role of the meaningfulness in it, but plurality of 
things can provide meaning in life. We can interpret it in terms of primary and secondary 
values. The meaningfulness itself is important to us because it is closely related to the 
shared features of human beings. It is an objective category of the good life. But there is a 
plurality of things that can provide our lives with the meaning. These things are – similarly 
to secondary values – dependent upon individuals and societies. 
The questions concerning the experience machine can also be answered in the light of 
pluralism and the meaningfulness: we would not want to be plugged into the machine 
because the good life is not merely about subjective pleasurable experiences, but 
accommodates the category of meaningfulness and there is a plurality of objects and 
                                                
50 See chapter 1.2.2 Moral vs non-moral point of view. 
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projects that can fulfil this condition. The meaning can be provided by different things in 
life, but there is also an objective dimension according to which we evaluate the 
worthiness of different projects and objects. But our evaluation is not purely individual: it 
is important for us to see life from one or another external point of view. We can agree 
with Kekes and say that there is a plurality of values: some of them might be more, others 
less important to us. But morally significant values – i.e. the primary values – are the 
values that can be seen as related to the essence of being a human and living a human life. 
Similarly, the meaningfulness can be seen as being tightly related to the shared core of 
human life. Satisfying the condition of meaningfulness can be understood as an essential 
part of the good life. In the case of the experience machine, we have subjective pleasurable 
experiences, but these experiences do not provide our life with the meaning. There is a 
difference whether a life is a ‘happy’ or a meaningful one. The two do not exclude each 
other, but for the good life the meaningfulness seems to be essential. In the good life, there 
is a strong subjective dimension, but the good life seems not to be limited by that. Next, I 
will turn to the further question concerning what might be the essence of the good life. 
3.2 Finding	  the	  maximum	  in	  balance	  
It looks that principle-based moral theories lead us to the life where we maximize one 
aspect – where we maximize morality. Our conduct should be led by the principles of 
morality. A moral saint is a person, who maximizes morality and lives according to moral 
principles, but she is not the person we would want to be and her life is not the one we 
would want to live. Thus, there is a question: if maximizing morality does not lead us to 
the good life then what does? In a nutshell, we can sum up the argumentation concerning 
the good life so far as follows: 
(1) The broad aim of moral theories is to help us to find the way to live well. The 
conceptions of the good life vary among moral theories.  
(2) According to principle-based moral theories there are certain principles that one 
should follow in life. One of these principles is authoritative before others. 
(3) It is hard to find a limit to the extent to which one should live according to 
moral principles. Principle-based approach to morality seems to lead to the 
maximizing of morality. 
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(4) The moral saints and their lives are unattractive to us. Morality dominates their 
character and life too strongly. We don’t see the life of a moral saint as the good 
life.  
(5) We evaluate lives from the point of view of individual perfection that 
accommodates different viewpoints: the good life consists of different aspects – 
moral and non-moral ones. The good life should be a well-rounded one.  
(6) In addition, the meaningfulness may be an important condition for the good life. 
The meaningfulness can be seen as providing the focus to the well-rounded life. 
In the case of principle-based moral theories we can see the principles as 
helping us reach the meaningful life, but in their case it seems that the meaning 
is provided by morality alone. 
(7) Still, there are multiple projects and objects that can provide life with the 
meaning. The relationship between the condition of meaningfulness and well-
roundedness is bilateral. Meaningfulness is one aspect of the well-rounded life, 
but also the well-roundedness is one condition that has to be preserved in the 
case of meaningfulness. The project that provides us with the meaning should 
not single-handedly dominate our life. 
(8) We can see this approach to the good life as a pluralistic one. There is a 
plurality of values, reasons, interests, projects, etc. that can be related to the 
meaningfulness and well-roundedness of life. Although there is a possibility of 
variance, there is an objective dimension in the good life and in our evaluation 
of it. The objectivity is based upon the common features of humanness – there 
are minimum conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to satisfy the basic 
human needs. 
(9) There are morally significant values. These values do not dominate our lives, 
but are nevertheless the most important ones. Thus, morality still has an 
important role to play in the concept of the good life, but the good life is not 
about the maximizing of one single aspect of our lives. 
We saw that morally significant values provide the minimum conditions for human life – 
these are the basis for the good life. But what is the maximum for the good life? 
Continuous maximizing of one aspect does not do the job. The question arises as to 
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whether we can find the maximum in maximizing after all.51 Moral theories should avoid 
the outcome that the maximum of the good life turns out to be maximizing itself. It seems 
that in the case of moral saints – in the case of principle-based moral theories – this cannot 
be done: it is hard to determine the limit to which the principles should be followed. For 
moral saints, being moral seems to end up with maximizing morality. Their concepts of the 
good life differ, but the life that we would end up with by following their principles would 
be similar – it would be dominated by morality.  
If we think about the good life in a pluralistic manner, the maximum might not be found in 
maximizing. Although morally significant values play the most important role at the 
minimum level of the good life, they must not dominate the good life in its maximum. One 
possibility is to understand the good life in terms of balance. This balance can consist of 
multiple values, interests, desires, and reasons. It is important that morally significant 
matters have a strong standing in this balance, but they should not become dominating. 
Similarly, when we think about the projects that provide us with the meaning in our lives 
and make us feel fulfilled, then these projects should not single-handedly dominate. Wolf 
talks about projects that are not suitable for giving meaning: there are objects that are not 
worthy enough to provide the meaning in our lives. Indeed, I can love hot chocolate and 
see it as contributing to the goodness of my life. It can provide me with plenty of 
pleasurable experiences, but seeing it as the main object that provides me with the feeling 
of fulfilment seems somewhat off. There is nothing wrong with hot chocolate, but there 
seems to be something weird about the role I give to it in my life. 
But is there any object at all that, when dominating, can give our life meaning in a way that 
would be sufficient to satisfy the condition of the good life? It looks doubtful. In other 
words, it seems to me that it does not really matter whether the project of our lives is 
drinking hot chocolate, healing the sick, or reading philosophy. In all of these cases, the 
problem lies in the fact that these actions are maximized. We also see a qualitative 
difference between these projects, but this is another question. In light of the good life, the 
main problem seems to lie in the domination of one aspect over the others.  
We find morality as unsuitable for dominating life in the case of moral saints – we say that 
this life is not a good life for us. But what would be better suitable for making the life good 
                                                
51 Wolf (2010: 109) also indicates that there is no reason to maximize meaningfulness. She claims that it does 
not look reasonable nor intelligible to make one’s life as meaningful as possible. 
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than morality? It seems to me that the maximum that we are looking for in the end does not 
consist in maximizing, but in balance. There are projects that can be better or worse for 
creating meaning, there are values that are more or less important, there are reasons that 
are more or less sound, and there are actions that are better or worse. But what is important 
in the end is that our life would not consist of a single one of them. There should be a 
balance between different values, interests, and desires. There is no single way to the good 
life, but there is a certain way one can deprive it – by letting one aspect to dominate single-
handedly.  
Seeing the maximum in balance is well compatible with the condition of well-roundedness 
that Wolf sees relevant. Well-roundedness itself seems to refer to a sort of balance in life. 
But it can be easier to understand the importance of different kinds of aspects of our lives 
in terms of balance instead of well-roundedness. Balance as such seems to refer that there 
are several aspects in play. Also the meaningfulness can still be an essential part of the 
good life – it can still serve as providing a focus. But while acknowledging different 
viewpoints to life, different aspects of life, and different projects that can provide us with 
the meaning in life we can still acknowledge the importance of morality in it. Moral values 
can be seen as the most important kind of values, since they are closely related to the 
shared content of human life.  
For some reason Wolf does not want to go that far with her analysis and state the 
ingredients of the good life. She even avoids determining the role of moral values in the 
good life. She probably wants to leave these questions open, because every approach to 
morality and the good life is accompanied with some problems. On the other hand, it 
seems to me that declining from giving any wider answers to the questions concerning the 
role of morality and moral values in our lives as well as the issues related to the objective 
dimension of values, underestimates moral theories. We can keep on thinking that the good 
life can differ among individuals and still state that there is a plurality of values, where 
moral values play a prominent role. 
Moral theories might not indicate the path to the good life, but they can show us the 
importance of moral values. Morally significant values do play a relevant role in the 
balance that should be found in the good life. These values are closely related to the 
objective dimension of the good life, but in the state of balance they stand next to other 
values that can be of non-moral kind and are nevertheless important to us. There are things 
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that are not worthwhile and draw us away from the good life, but it is essential to 
understand that multiple lives can be good. After all, I can enjoy hot chocolate, take care of 
sick people, and devote all of the beautiful springtime to writing a thesis that only a 
handful of people will ever read, and still live a life that is a perfectly good one. The good 
life, the maximum, and the balance that we are looking for may be about the absence of 
dominance not about the determination of the ingredients of the good life. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I focused on Susan Wolf’s view on moral perfection and the good life. 
With the help of moral saints, Wolf wants to show that moral perfection does not lead to a 
good life. Moral perfection belongs to the perfectly moral life, but this is not the life we 
would like to live. Rather, it turns out to be the outcome of principle-based moral theories. 
In general, Wolf argues against moral theories that press for living according to the leading 
principle of morality. In other words, Wolf argues against the moral theories that state that 
we should live according to moral principles in order to live the right way and thus also 
reach the good life understood accordingly. The problem is that these theories do not seem 
to draw an explicit line to which extent it is mandatory for a moral agent to follow the 
principles and to which extent is the agent already going beyond the necessary limit – they 
do not make use of the concept of the supererogation. Thus, if we follow their teachings to 
perfection, then it seems that we end up with maximizing morality in our life. The concepts 
of the good life differ among theories as well as among different people, but at least the life 
that we reach by maximizing morality does not seem to be the life we would like. 
Following Wolf’s lead, I examined the question concerning the role of morality in the good 
life. If we agree with Wolf’s understanding, it is unclear what kind of role morality and 
moral values can play in our lives after all. In addition, there are the questions about the 
objectivity of values and the objective dimension in the good life.  
I arrived at the conclusion that although we may not like to live a perfectly moral life, 
morality still plays an important role in the good life. The concept of the good life is not 
purely subjective – there is also an objective dimension. One possibility is to see this 
objective dimension in morality. First of all, when we evaluate lives from the point of view 
of individual perfection as Wolf proposes, then the objective dimension of our evaluation 
can be seen in the point of view of morality. Wolf never excludes the moral point of view 
from the picture, she just adds another – more pluralistic – dimension to it. Furthermore, 
when we think about meaningfulness that is important in the evaluation and in the good 
life in general, there is an objective dimension in this category as well. Meaningfulness is 
essential for the good life because it provides the well-rounded life with a focus. The 
values are realized in different ways in different lives, but the objective dimension of the 
good life can be found in the shared features of human beings. These features form the 
basis for universal claims that satisfy the basic needs when fulfilled. Basic needs are 
essential for the minimum level of human welfare. We can see these features as the basis 
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for moral values – or rather, for the values that are morally significant. These values 
provide us with the objective dimension, but do not exclude other kinds of values from the 
picture. Moral values are still essential to us. The fact that Wolf criticizes the ideals of 
principle-based moral theories does not mean that moral values are unimportant. 
If following the principles may not bring us closer to the good life according to common 
sense, it seems that the good life for us is not about maximizing one single principle or one 
set of values. But if maximizing morality does not do the job, how can we reach the good 
life: What is the essence of the good life? I proposed that we can find the good life when 
we look for a balance between different aspects of our lives. This balance can be seen as a 
maximum, but it is not about maximizing. We have different values, principles, reasons, 
interests, and desires. They can be moral as well as non-moral. In the balance that we are 
looking for, it is not determined what kind of values, principles, reasons, interests, and 
desires one must have and promote. The ratio between different aspects is also not dictated. 
Rather, it is important that one aspect would not single-handedly dominate over others. If 
maximum devotion to morality that brings the objective dimension to our lives does not 
look suitable for the good life, it is hard to imagine why should any other.  
I arrived to these conclusions by taking the following three steps. In the first chapter of my 
thesis I focused on Wolf’s characterization of moral saints. Wolf’s picture of moral saints 
is provocative as it questions the ideals of principle-based moral theories. According to 
Wolf, if we try to picture a perfectly moral person and a perfectly moral life that 
corresponds to principle-based moral theories, then these ideals can be perfectly moral, yet 
they are not perfect for us. The problem lies in the way principle-based moral theories 
emphasize the realization of the leading principles and the leading values. The problem is 
that following the leading principle and leading values tends to lead to the maximizing of 
these principles and values. In this chapter I first described the general character and life of 
moral saints. I brought out the pros and cons of being a moral saint. The former can be 
seen in the goodness of moral saints. The latter lies in the limited scope of their interests 
and desires. Second, I explained that the shortcomings of moral saints occur because they 
abstain from non-moral interests, values, and reasons that are important to us. The general 
problem is that their life is limited to the moral sphere. The life of a moral saint does not 
look like a well-rounded one: morality may become single-handedly dominating. This 
leads us to the second concern of Wolf – the scope of moral theories. If moral theories 
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remain true to the moral point of view that is peculiar to them, they may not comprehend 
all the facets of our lives. Our lives consist of moral as well as non-moral aspects. When 
the latter is left aside, then the image remains partial. The principle-based moral theories 
may not adequately take into consideration the whole of our lives, but just the moral 
domain – the moral sphere. Wolf proposes that in search of the good life we evaluate our 
lives from the point of view of individual perfection instead of the moral one. The point of 
view of individual perfection allows us to see the objective as well as the subjective 
dimensions of the good life. It also takes into account moral as well as non-moral aspects. 
Finally, I examined more deeply how Wolf understands the good life. I brought out well-
roundedness, meaningfulness, and fulfilment that Wolf sees as important aspects of the 
good life. I explained that these categories are compatible with the point of view of 
individual perfection. Furthermore, they complement the point of view of individual 
perfection by bringing out important aspects that the good life ought to accommodate. 
According to Wolf, it is important that the good life were meaningful. Meaningfulness can 
be understood as providing a focus to a well-rounded life. The meaning in life is related to 
the feeling of fulfilment. There are subjective and objective elements included in these 
categories. The feeling of fulfilment is subjective: the objects and projects that we are 
engaged with depend upon individual. But we want our projects that provide us with the 
meaning to be approved from some point of view external to ourselves as well. We need 
some sense of objectivity. 
In the second chapter of my thesis I took into consideration Vanessa Carbonell’s and 
Robert M. Adams’ critique against Wolf’s characterization of moral saints. First, I 
described Carbonell’s and Adams’ understandings of moral saints. They claim that moral 
saints are not unattractive as Wolf claims, that they are suitable role models after all. Next, 
I brought out the mistakes in Wolf’s reasoning according to Carbonell and Adams. By 
bringing in the virtue of charity, Carbonell claims that Wolf’s moral saints are self-
defeating. In addition, there is a confusion concerning the viewpoints that moral saints take 
up. According to Carbonell, moral saints can have interests and desires of different kind – 
morality and a moral point of view do not exclude other aspects of life. Moral saints might 
take up the moral point of view, but the moral point of view itself is compatible with the 
point of view of individual perfection. Also according to Adams, taking up the moral point 
of view is not as extreme as Wolf describes. Both Carbonell and Adams claim that moral 
saint’s life can be well-rounded despite of morality being their main concern. Second, I 
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defended Wolf against her critics. I showed that Carbonell’s critique is questionable 
concerning the virtue of charity: moral saints are not self-defeating, rather it seems that 
Carbonell’s critique is self-defeating. It is doubtful whether blind charity is a virtue after 
all and that moral saints described by Wolf should have blind charity in their arsenal of 
character traits. Next, I examined the essence of moral sainthood described by Wolf, 
Carbonell, and Adams. I showed that the main aspect of moral sainthood is the 
intertwining of goodness and morality in moral saints. In addition, I explained that Wolf’s 
understanding concerning the moral point of view holds and Adams’ critique concerning 
the incompatibility of the utilitarian moral saint and the moral point of view misses the 
essence of moral sainthood. Finally, I proposed that the good life might consist of finding a 
balance between different aspects of life. In this balance moral values can still be the most 
important, but they are not dominating single-handedly. There is not one single aspect that 
should be maximized in the search for the good life. Next, I turned to test my proposal. 
In the third chapter of my thesis I argued for my proposals concerning the good life. First, I 
examined with which wider approach to morality the Wolfian concept of the good life 
complies. I opened the question with the help of Nozick’s experience machine. I compared 
Wolf’s views with relativism and pluralism. Wolf’s views are not compatible with 
relativism. Although different lives can be good ones, there are limits to the projects that 
can make life meaningful. The conditions for different projects are not relative to society 
or culture. In addition, I drew an interesting parallel between Wolf’s description of the 
importance of meaning and Axel Honneth’s approach to the self-realization. Both 
philosophers see morality as an important aspect of the good life, but they see the good life 
as a combination of individual and inter-individual dimensions. For Honneth, the 
conditions for self-realization are inter-individual and the objective dimension seems to be 
provided by society. For Wolf, on the other hand, the conditions for meaningfulness seem 
to be in need of some non-subjective dimension other than society or tradition. Wolf’s 
views are well compatible with pluralism. There are different values and principles that are 
not reducible to a single one. Morally significant values can be seen as the most important 
kind of values. John Kekes bases these values in the shared features that humans have in 
common. There are basic needs – derived from the basic facts about human beings – that 
have to be fulfilled for the minimum welfare of a human being. Finally, I concluded that 
since we do not reach the good life by maximizing one single aspect, we could understand 
the good life in terms of balance instead. We can see the good life as a balance between 
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different kinds of principles, values, reasons, interests, and desires. Seeing the good life as 
a balance is compatible with the conditions of well-roundedness and meaningfulness stated 
by Wolf. Also, the projects that provide one’s life with the meaning should not be single-
handedly dominating, but their importance should fit to the balance. Although moral values 
are still the most important ones, they should not dominate over all the other ones. They 
are important for the minimum welfare, but do not suffice for the maximum. In this sense, 
maximum cannot be found maximizing. Maximum is about balance.  
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Summary 
 
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis 
I am examining the problem concerning the relationship between morality and the good 
life according to Susan Wolf’s critique against the principle-based ethical theories. The 
main question is that if we find questionable the concept of the good life that principle-
based ethical theories lead us to, what role does morality play in the good life after all? Is 
morality still important? 
In the first chapter, I introduce Wolf’s characterization of moral saints and their lives. I 
explain why they may not be our ideals. In the second chapter, I argue against some critics 
of Wolf and show that their critique against Wolf’s ideas is questionable. I propose that 
even if principle-based moral theories are mistaken – as Wolf claims – morality can still 
play an important role in the good life. A good life can be found in balance between 
different aspects: moral and non-moral ones. 
In the third chapter I test my proposal. I look at the concept of the good life stemming from 
Wolf’s writings in the context of moral relativism and pluralism. I conclude that the good 
life can be understood in balance where multiple values, principles, reasons, interests, and 
desires are represented. There is no single way to the good life, but morality still has an 
important role to play. 
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Resümee 
 
Susan Wolf moraalsest täiuslikkusest ja heast elust: kriitiline analüüs 
Magistritöös uurin moraali ja hea elu vahelist suhet. Töös lähtun Susan Wolfi kriitikast 
printsiibipõhiste eetika teooriate vastu. Peamine küsimus on: kui me leiame, et 
printsiibipõhiste eetika teooriate hea elu kontseptsioonid on küsitavad, siis missugune on 
moraali roll heas elus – kas moraal on jätkuvalt oluline? 
Esimeses peatükis tutvustan Wolfi arusaama moraalipühakutest ja nende elust. Seletan, 
miks nad ei pruugi olla meie ideaalid. Teises peatükis vaidlen vastu Wolfi kriitikutele ja 
näitan, et nende kriitika on küsitav. Pakun välja, et isegi kui printsiibipõhised eetika 
teooriad tõesti eksivad – nagu väidab Wolf – saab moraal siiski mängida olulist rolli heas 
elus. Head elu saab mõista kui tasakaalu mitmesuguste – moraalsete ja mittemoraalsete – 
aspektide vahel. 
Kolmandas peatükis panen oma pakkumise proovile. Vaatan Wolfi arusaamast lähtuvat 
hea elu kontseptsiooni moraalirelativismi ja -pluralismi valguses. Jõuan järeldusele, et head 
elu saab mõista tasakaaluna, kus on esindatud mitmesugused väärtused, printsiibid, 
põhjused, huvid ja soovid. Ei ole üht ainsat teed, mis viiks hea eluni, aga moraalil on siiski 
hea elu kontseptsioonis oluline osa. 
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